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COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION IN
NORTH CAROLINA: SELECTED ISSUES
OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
THOMAS L. FOWLER*
I. COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION IN NORTH CAROLINA
In June of 1985 the Task Force on Dispute Resolution1 recom-
mended that North Carolina establish in three judicial districts a
pilot project of court-ordered arbitration to resolve civil disputes
involving $ 15,000 or less. The Task Force's report found that six-
teen states and nine federal courts had, by 1985, adopted some
form of mandatory, non-binding arbitration and that crowded
court dockets were the primary motivation.2 The Task Force noted
that the high cost and delay that typify traditional litigation often
defeat the goals of parties with relatively small civil actions. The
Task Force found that alternatives to litigation in these small civil
suits may not only be more efficient in terms of time and money
but may also "result in less alienation, produce a feeling that the
dispute was really heard, and fulfill a need to regain control by not
handing the problem over to lawyers, judges and the intricacies of
the legal system."3 Based largely upon the Task Force's report,
* Mr. Fowler is currently an attorney with the North Carolina
Administrative Office of the Courts in Raleigh, North Carolina. He received his
B.A. and J.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The opinions
expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent any
official or unofficial position or policy of the Administrative Office of the Courts.
1. The Task Force was created by then North Carolina Bar Association
President Charles L. Fulton in November 1983 to study and propose "new and
promising" methods for resolving disputes other than conventional litigation. In
addition to arbitration, the Task Force studied mediation, summary jury trials,
fee shifting devices, reference to special masters, dispute settlement centers, etc.
NORTH CAROLINA BAR FOUNDATION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A TASK FORCE REPORT
(1985) [hereinafter N.C. BAR FOUND].
2. Id. at 19.
3. Id. at 10, quoting NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PATHS
TO JUSTICE, 10 (1986); see also NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION, COURT
ORDERED ARBITRATION: REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 2
(1989) [hereinafter N.C. BAR Ass'N] which sought to qualify the reasons for
investigating the usefulness of court-ordered arbitration: "In supporting the
court-ordered arbitration program, the North Carolina Bar Association was not
191
1
Fowler: Court-Ordered Arbitration in North Carolina: Selected Issues of P
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
the General Assembly authorized an experimental program of
court-ordered, non-binding arbitration for claims under $15,000.'
The enabling legislation granted to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina the power to establish the pilot programs and to adopt
rules of arbitration to govern the proceedings.5
The arbitration rules adopted by the Supreme Court in
August of 1986 followed most of the principles proposed in the
Task Force's report. Under the Rules, civil claims for $15,000 or
less are subject to -mandatory arbitration but the arbitration
award is not binding and either party can seek trial de novo.7
Arbitrators are experienced attorneys, trained as arbitrators, who
can be chosen by mutual agreement of the parties, and who are
reacting to any perceived crisis or seeking to meet the needs of any special
interest group. . . . [Tihere is no widespread belief that the present system is
somehow failing. Rather,. this program was recommended based upon a wide-
ranging consensus that the court-ordered arbitration process had shown
sufficient promise elsewhere in improving the administration of justice that its
use in North Carolina should be conditionally explored." N.C. BAR FOUND. supra
note 2 at 10.
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-37 (1985). "In order to determine whether a system
of mandatory, nonbinding arbitration of small cases may help reduce costs in the
trial division of the General Court of Justice and make the operation of these
divisions generally more efficient, the Supreme Court of North Carolina may, by
such rules as it shall determine appropriate, provide for an experimental, pilot
program in three judicial districts selected by the Court, of mandatory,
nonbinding arbitration of all claims for money damages of fifteen thousand
dollars or less. The rules shall make all such claims subject to decision initially
by arbitration; but the rules must also insure that no party is deprived of the
right to a jury trial and that any party dissatisfied with the arbitration award
may receive a trial de novo ...." Id.
5. Id.; see also N.C. Bar ASS'N supra note 4, at 1-2.
6. Two significant differences between the Task Force recommendations and
the Rules adopted by the Supreme Court concern the initial scheduling of the
arbitration hearing and the length of the hearing. The Task Force recommended
scheduling the arbitration within 150 days of the last responsive pleading. N.C.
BAR FOUND. supra note 2, at 2. Rule 8, of the North Carolina Rules for Court-
Ordered Arbitration, requires the arbitration to be scheduled within 60 days of
the last responsive pleading. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 8 (1986). The Task Force
recommended that the arbitrator should "ordinarily allow each side up to one
hour for presentation of its case." N.C. BAR FOUND. supra note 2 at 2. Rule 3(n),
Rules for Court-Ordered Arbitration, states that arbitration hearings "shall be
limited to one hour unless the arbitrator determines ... that more time is
necessary." N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(n).
7. This contrasts with commercial or contractual arbitration where the
decision to engage in arbitration is generally voluntary while the arbitration
award is usually binding.
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compensated by the state at the rate of seventy-five dollars per
arbitration. The arbitration hearings are relatively informal, are
generally to be completed within a one hour time period, and the
rules of evidence are not strictly followed but serve only as a guide
for the arbitrator in hearing or excluding evidence.8 The role of
the arbitrator is limited to presiding at the hearing and rendering
an award,9 whether or not one or both parties appear.' ° The arbi-
trator does not schedule hearings, hear or grant motions to con-
tinue, hear or grant pre-trial or post-hearing motions." The
responsibility for notifying the parties of the selection of their case
for arbitration, selecting the presiding arbitrator, scheduling the
hearing, and general administrative functions resides with the
"arbitration coordinator" who is appointed to oversee the arbitra-
tion process in each district with an arbitration program.
12
Motions for continuances, other pre-trial motions, motions for
rehearings, etc. are made to the "court," which may be either the
senior resident superior court judge, the chief district court judge
or another superior or district court judge who has been assigned
to handle the matter.'
3
In January of 1987 court-ordered arbitration began in North
Carolina. Three judicial districts were chosen as pilot sites for
arbitration: the Third Judicial District (Carteret, Craven, Pam-
lico, and Pitt Counties); the Fourteenth Judicial District (Durham
County); and the Twenty-Ninth District (Henderson, McDowell,
8. For more detail, the Arbitration Rules themselves should be consulted and
there are excellent overviews found in the following articles: William Kinsland
Edwards, "No Frills" Justice: North Carolina Experiments With Court-Ordered
Arbitration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 395, 402-408 (1988); George K. Walker, Court-
Ordered Arbitration Comes to North Carolina and the Nation, 21 WAKE FoREST
L. REV. 901 (1986).
9. The arbitrator's duties are complete upon filing the award. N.C. CT.-ORD.
ARB. R. 2 (commentary).
10. See infra, Part III. D.
11. See N.C. CT.-ORD. Ann. R. 3(a) (arbitration hearings shall be scheduled by
the "court"); Id. at R. 3(q) (the "court" may consider and determine any motion at
any time; pendency of a motion shall not be cause for delaying an arbitration
hearing); Id. at R. 8(b) (the "court" shall schedule hearings and the hearing may
be continued only by the "court"); Id. at R. 8(f) (definition of "court" as used in
Rules). Rule 3(i) also makes clear that all ex parte communications by the
parties or their counsel with the arbitrator are prohibited. Id. at R. 3(i).
.12. Rule 8(e) provides the basis for delegating these administrative functions
to the arbitration coordinator. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 8(e).
13. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARm. R. 8(f).
1999] 193
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Polk, Rutherford, and Transylvania Counties).14 The Institute of
Government at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
evaluated these pilot programs on the basis of eligible cases filed
from January through June of 1987.11 The results of the Insti-
tute's study were included in a report to the Supreme Court by the
North Carolina Bar Association. 16 These results showed that the
experimental program had met its goals of resolving eligible cases
faster than did standard procedures, reducing the number of cases
that required a trial, and being favorably regarded by the litigants
and the attorneys who participated in the arbitration proceed-
ings. 17 In addition, surveys of attorneys practicing civil law in
each of the pilot districts indicated that a large majority favored
continuation and expansion of the program."
Based on the Institute's study and the support of the North
Carolina Bar Association and the Supreme Court, the General
Assembly in 1989 adopted section 7A-37.1 which authorized
"court-ordered nonbinding arbitration as an alternative civil pro-
cedure."1 9 The statute also provided that although the Supreme
Court may adopt rules governing arbitration procedure, such
rules should provide that no party may be deprived of the right to
a jury trial, that arbitration should be available in civil actions
where the claims do not exceed $ 15,000, and that arbitrators
shall have the same immunity as judges from civil liability for
their official conduct.2" Subsection (d) of the statute also makes
clear that judicial districts are not required to establish a court-
14. These districts were selected because of their diversity, i.e., the Third
Judicial District is semi-urban and in the eastern part of the state, the
Fourteenth is urban in the central part, and the Twenty-ninth is rural and in the
far west. This diversity was expected to improve the accuracy of the evaluation
of court-ordered arbitration's usefulness and effectiveness statewide. N.C BAR
Ass'N. supra note 2, at 2.
15. STEVENS H. CLARKE ET AL., INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, COURT-ORDERED
ARBITRATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: AN EVALUATION OF ITS EFFECTS (1989).
16. N.C. BAR ASS'N supra note 2.
17. According to the Executive Summary contained in the Bar Association's
report, the arbitration program reduced the disposition time (i.e., the time from
filing to disposition) in contested cases assigned to it by 33 to 45 percent; the
program reduced the trial rate in contested cases by about two-thirds; and
winning litigants were equally happy with whatever legal procedure was utilized
but losing litigants were "considerably more satisfied with the arbitration
program than with standard procedure." Id. at 34-37.
18. Id. at 36-37.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-37.1.
20. Id.
194 [Vol. 21:191
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ordered arbitration program in their district but that the decision
to establish, continue or terminate a program should be made by
the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts and the dis-
trict's senior resident superior court judge and chief district court
judge.2 ' Since 1989, court-ordered arbitration has expanded as
state funding has allowed so that as of this writing, thirty-one of
the state's forty-six judicial districts have court-ordered arbitra-
tion programs. As recently as 1994, based on a survey undertaken
by the Supreme Court Dispute Resolution Committee chaired by
Justice Henry E. Frye, the court-ordered arbitration program was
found "[a]gainst every measure" to be a success... [that enhanced]
government's responsiveness to its citizens."22
Despite the apparent success of court-ordered arbitration, the
process is not without its detractors.23 Some object that interpos-
ing the arbitration process between filing the complaint and pro-
ceeding to trial and requiring the additional payment of a seventy-
five dollar fee to secure trial de novo, interferes with the constitu-
tional right to a jury trial.2 4 Some object that the informality of
21. Id. at 1(d).
22. NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION COMMITTEE, INTERIM
REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE COURTS (1994).
23. See generally, Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-
Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 2169 (1993); James E. Smith, Don't Rush to Justice: An Argument
Against Binding North Dakota Courts to Arbitration, 73 N.D. L. REV. 459 (1997).
For a generally positive treatment see Michael E. Weinzierl, Wisconsin's New
Court-Ordered ADR Law: Why It Is Needed And Its Potential For Success, 78
MARQ. L. REV. 583 (1995).
24. Requiring participation in arbitration as a precondition to a jury trial and
requiring an additional payment to "appeal" an arbitration award may chill the
right to a jury trial but most commentators have concluded that this effect is not
unconstitutional. See Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution
Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REv. 487, 502-521 (1989); see
also, Sharon A. Jennings, Court-Annexed Arbitration and Settlement Pressure: A
Push Towards Efficient Dispute Resolution of "Second-Class" Justice?, 6 OIo ST.
J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 313 (1991) (review of various sanctions used to increase
settlement pressure in court-annexed arbitration); Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn,
478 F.Supp. 566 (E.D. Penn. 1979) (holding that application of local experimental
rule providing for compulsory nonbinding arbitration as a prerequisite to jury
trial in certain civil suits for recovery of money damages of $ 50,000 or less does
not violate right to jury trial or equal protection). Nevertheless, the issue may be
raised. Some parties have added the following language on their request for trial
de novo: "Please be advised that Plaintiff objects to the payment of the seventy-
five dollar filing fee as an unconstitutional restriction on plaintiffs right to jury
19991
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the hearing and the one hour time limitation diminish the impor-
tance of the evidence and the law's normal rights-based or fault-
based2" resolution of conflicts 26 and elevates the importance of
and pressure to compromise.27 Indeed, North Carolina's one hour
court-ordered arbitration hearing could be viewed more as a set-
tlement device rather than a true adjudicatory procedure. 2s After
all, even if the parties do not negotiate their own settlement after
the arbitrator's award, if neither party demands trial de novo the
arbitrator's award is their de facto settlement. Perhaps the adju-
dicatory guise of court-ordered arbitration, if that is what it is, is
trial, and is otherwise unconstitutional. The payment of this fee at this time by
Plaintiff is not a waiver of his assertion of this abridgement of his federally and
state protected rights."
25. "[When we speak of law courts and adjudication, we speak of institutions
and procedures that aim not merely to resolve disputes, but to do so by enforcing
the rights and duties of the parties; rights and duties that they could and
perhaps should have known, and may have been relying upon, when they fell
into a quarrel." Paul D. Carrington, ADR and Future Adjudication: A Primer on
Dispute Resolution, 15 REV. LITIG. 485, 486 (1996).
26. "Because the presentations are generally shorter, it is argued court-
annexed arbitration considers fault a lesser issue and de-emphasizes the
importance of evidence. . . . Court-annexed arbitration programs are often
criticized as an overly-oppressive tool for encouraging settlement. Because over
ninety percent of all cases in federal court reach a settlement without going to
trial, court-annexed arbitration and other ADR programs are often seen as
merely providing the inevitable." Smith, supra note 23, at 470-71.
27. See generally, Jennings, supra note 25. "One concern of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) programs is the propriety of using settlement pressure
to eliminate cases from the docket. Tension exists between pushing parties to
settle earlier than on the courthouse steps and unduly discouraging them from
pursuing their rightful claims in court. Although some ADR programs perform
an adjudicative function, the results are not binding and, thus, ADR resolves
disputes only if the parties reach an agreement. Sanctions are used to increase
the cost-effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution by creating an additional
incentive to adopt the ADR result, instead of proceeding to trial." Id.
28. One commentator has concluded that the goal of court-ordered,
nonbinding arbitration is "to produce a settlement figure that may be considered
by the parties in future settlement discussions." Weinzierl, supra note 24, at
596. "Characterizing the process as a settlement device in no way detracts from
its legitimacy. Since the current settlement rate is ninety to ninety-five percent,
protesting the use of court-annexed arbitration on the grounds that it merely
encourages settlement ignores the realities of our judicial system. Given the
high settlement rate, court-annexed arbitration simply encourages the most
probably result and introduces an element of objectivity not present in
traditional settlement negotiations. A well-designed program encourages those
parties that will settle to do so at an earlier time, but leaves others free to pursue
their litigation in court without undue penalty." Jennings, supra note 25, at 317.
196 [Vol. 21:191
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nevertheless important in convincing the parties that they have
had their day in court and that they should acquiesce in the arbi-
trator's decision. As one commentator has noted:
Some argue... that court-annexed arbitration should be con-
sidered a mechanism for achieving settlement and that arbitrators
should not be content with simply rendering an award; rather like
para-judicial personnel assigned to other programs of alternative
dispute resolution they should view their function as one of pro-
moting settlements. [However] [tihere are substantial risks
involved with this approach. Litigants are often willing to accept
an informal tribunal as a legitimate alternative to the formalities
and technicalities that are the hallmark of the courtroom, pro-
vided it has been charged with determining the merits of a claim
or defense and provided it offers a fair hearing focused on legal
rights. But this is very different from viewing the hearing as a
means of exerting pressure on the parties to avoid the merits in
order to reduce expense and delay. To make court-annexed arbi-
tration little more than a mechanism for achieving settlement is to
run the risk of diminishing its effectiveness in terminating cases
and reducing litigant satisfaction with the process. 29
In any event, it is interesting to note that despite the appar-
ent success of court-ordered arbitration the General Assembly has
consistently declined to increase funding of the program to allow
an increase in the fee paid to arbitrators, or to increase the
amount in controversy for the civil actions that are subject to arbi-
tration. Both amounts remain at the same level that was selected
in 1986.10 Other states with court-ordered arbitration programs
have chosen to increase the amount in controversy limitation in
29. Leo Levin, Court-Annexed Arbitration, 16 J.L. REFORM 537, 546 (1983).
30. Arbitrators are paid seventy-five dollars per hearing, N.C. CT.-ORD ARB.
R. 2(c). By statute, cases eligible for court-ordered arbitration are civil actions
seeking $ 15,000 or less. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-37.1. Some counties have chosen,
by local rule, to expand the use of court-ordered arbitration to cases seeking in
excess of $ 15,000. For instance, the local rules of Gaston County require the
parties in every superior court civil case to participate in one of three alternative
dispute resolution procedures: court-ordered arbitration, mediated settlement
conference, or private arbitration or mediation. If the parties do not timely select
one of the alternatives, "the parties are considered to affirmatively agree, and the
court to have approved, the case being ordered into the Civil Arbitration Program
regardless of the amount of monetary relief sought pursuant with Rule 1(b) of the
Supreme Court's "Rules for Court Ordered Arbitration in North Carolina."
GASTON CousTY, N.C. CML LocAL R. 22.
1999]
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order to expand the number of civil cases that are subject to
arbitration.3
It should be noted that at least some of this resistance to
expanding court-ordered arbitration in North Carolina may arise
from the creation and the popularity of the system of court-
ordered mediated settlement conferences for superior court civil
actions. In 1991 the General Assembly authorized a pilot pro-
gram of court-ordered mediated settlement conferences for civil
actions in superior court 32 and the program was adopted for state-
wide implementation in 1995.33 There are several differences
between the mediation program and court-ordered arbitration. 31
Aside from the significant differences in the duties of the arbitra-
tor and the mediator, it is important to note that mediators are
paid substantially more than arbitrators and the cost of mediation
is born entirely by the parties themselves, whereas in arbitration
the state pays the arbitrator's fee. There may be legitimate
debate as to the relative merits of mandatory mediation versus
non-binding arbitration as a means of efficiently resolving dis-
putes,35 but North Carolina's court-ordered arbitration program
31. In 1993, Illinois amended its statute authorizing mandatory arbitration to
raise the amount in controversy for civil cases subject to arbitration from $
15,000 to $ 50,000. 735 ILL. Comp. STAT. 5/2-1001A (West 1993). California's
Judicial Arbitration Rules for Civil Cases also provides for arbitration in all
actions "where the amount in controversy does not exceed $ 50,000 as to any
plaintiff." CAL. CT. R. 1600. (1998). In Rhode Island the amount in controversy
for claims subject to court-ordered arbitration is $ 100,000. R.I. ARB. R. 1 (1998).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38 (1991), repealed by 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 500 § 3.
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1 (1995).
34. The mediator does not resolve disputed issues of fact, make conclusions of
law and render an award, rather the mediator meets with the parties, both
together and separately, to discuss and facilitate a resolution of the civil action.
The mediator has no authority to impose a resolution or settlement on the
parties. There is no time limit on the mediation proceeding, it continues until
the mediator determines that further discussion is not warranted. Court officials
or employees are not involved in scheduling the mediation or in paying the
mediator. Instead, the mediator, selected or appointed to the case, schedules the
mediation conference and is paid by the parties. Unless the mediator and the
parties agree otherwise, the mediator is paid an administrative fee of $ 100 for
each mediation and $ 100 per hour for the duration of the mediation conference.
Id.
35. See the discussion of the Florida Model (primarily mediation) and the
Illinois Model (primarily arbitration) contained in Weinzierl supra note 23, at
598-604.
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may be unlikely to expand into the territory now subject to the
mandatory mediation program. 6
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES FOR COURT-ORDERED
ARBITRATION
Although North Carolina's court-ordered arbitration system
has been functioning since 1987, there is only one reported case
from our appellate courts in which the Rules for Court-Ordered
Arbitration are cited.3 v The reason the Arbitration Rules have not
been and will not often be cited, interpreted or applied by our
appellate courts is found in the Rules themselves. If a dissatisfied
party does not "appeal" an arbitration award by timely demanding
a trial de novo,35 the court enters judgment on the award "which
shall have the same effect as a consent judgment in the action."39
This judgment entered on the arbitrator's award is not appeala-
ble. It is after all a consent judgment and "there is no record for
review by an appellate court."40 The award is avoided only by fil-
ing a demand for a trial de novo, and the trial de novo is conducted
as if there had been no arbitration proceeding at all,4 1 in which
case the arbitrator's award is simply a nullity. Thus, the various
interlocutory decisions made by the arbitrator during the arbitra-
tion hearing that culminate in the final arbitration award, e.g.,
findings of fact, legal analyses, interpretations of the procedures
and the arbitrator's authority under the Rules for Court-Ordered
Arbitration, will generally escape appellate review for error.
Exempting the arbitrator's decision from review for error is
justified in light of the purposes and policies behind court-ordered
36. This is not to claim that there are not other legitimate reasons for not
expanding North Carolina's court-ordered arbitration program. For instance,
North Carolina's rule limiting arbitration hearings to one hour may weigh
against subjecting more complicated civil actions (e.g., those with damages
claims greater than $ 15,000) to court-ordered arbitration's summary
adjudication. North Carolina's one hour time limitation for arbitration hearings
may be unique among the states with such programs. A review of the court-
ordered arbitration rules for Arizona, California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Utah and Washington revealed no comparable time limitation.
37. Taylor v. Cadle, - N.C.App. __, 502 S.E.2d 692 (1998).
38. N.C. CT.-ORD ARB. R. 5.
39. . Id. at R. 6(b).
40. Id. at R. 6 (commentary).
41. Id. at R. 5.
1999]
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arbitration.42 It is not of great importance to determine whether
the arbitrator erred in a factual determination or legal interpreta-
tion if those issues will be litigated de novo before a judge or jury.
Likewise it makes little difference if the arbitrator erred in the
details if both parties are satisfied enough with the award to
waive their right to trial de novo. However, like any body of law
the Arbitration Rules do not clearly and unambiguously address
all questions concerning arbitration procedure or an arbitrator's
authority that arise during a proceeding. Occasionally the mean-
ing of the Rules must be interpreted or the application of the
Rules interpolated. Without appellate review to resolve conflict-
ing interpretations, the Rules may not be interpreted uniformly
across the state. Perhaps equally as important, with no case law
to refer to, each interpretive question will appear to be a matter of
first impression instead of an issue that has been addressed and
resolved hundreds of times by other arbitrators, arbitration coor-
dinators and supervising judges.43 Thus some have perceived the
usefulness of a vehicle for sharing some of the issues that arise in
arbitration proceedings that require interpretation of the Rules
and explaining each issue's resolution and supporting reasoning.
This article is intended as that vehicle which will identify some of
these issues and offer insight into their resolution.
The author's interest in this area of the law arises from his
experience with court-ordered arbitration as both the attorney
representing parties in arbitration and as the arbitrator presiding
over the hearings themselves," and his present position with the
Administrative Office of the Courts in which capacity he is regu-
larly referred questions about the Arbitration Rules.45 The author
42. "The purpose of these [arbitration] rules is to create an efficient,
economical alternative to traditional litigation for prompt resolution of disputes
.. " Id. at R. 1 (commentary).
43. The values of predictability of the law and judicial efficiency, often
associated with the justifications of stare decisis, would also seem to be
important to the arbitration process. See Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent,
66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 368-72 (1988) (listing the justifications for following
precedent as certainty and reliance, equality, efficiency, the appearance ofjustice
and the avoidance of arbitrary decision making).
44. From 1987 to 1992, the author presided as arbitrator in over 250
arbitrations in the Pilot Program in Durham County. The author was also the
arbitrator in Bass v. Goss, 109 N.C.App. 242, 412 S.E.2d 145 (1992) discussed in
section III(e) and has been a certified mediator in North Carolina's pilot Superior
Court Mediation Program since 1992.
45. Questions are often forwarded to the AOC from arbitrators, judges and
arbitration coordinators. The author has had the invaluable opportunity to
200 [Vol. 21:191
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has had the opportunity to learn which are the most commonly
asked and/or perplexing questions concerning court-ordered arbi-
tration and has attempted to select these for inclusion below. It
should, of course, be noted that the resolutions and supporting
reasoning of the issues that follow are in no way binding on the
attorneys, arbitration coordinators, arbitrators or supervising
judge involved in court-ordered arbitration. These resolutions and
rationales are offered for whatever use and consideration parties
or court officials involved in arbitration wish, and they should be
followed only to the extent they logically assist in answering the
issue.46
III. THE ISSUES
A. Pre-trial Motions and Arbitration
Pursuant to Arbitration Rule 8(b), the arbitration hearing is
scheduled to occur within sixty days47 of the docketing of the
appeal from small claims court, the filing of the last responsive
pleading or expiration of the time allowed to file such pleading.
Thus the arbitration hearing may often be held before the parties'
discovery is complete or before pre-trial motions, such as a motion
for summary judgment, have been filed or decided. Incomplete
discovery or pending motions will not, in general, be grounds to
delay the arbitration hearing."' Such a result is not unreasonable
in light of the relatively less complicated issues typical of civil
actions involving claims for $ 15,000 or less, the informal and
summary nature of the arbitration proceeding itself,49 the non-
review and discuss many of these questions with AOC Counsel Thomas J.
Andrews, AOC Associate Counsel Pamela W. Best, and AOC Court Management
Specialist Miriam Saxon.
46. This is borrowed from one definition of dicta: dicta should not influence a
later decision unless it logically assists in answering the new question. Muncie v.
Insurance Co., 253 N.C. 74, 79, 116 S.E.2d 474, 477 (1960).
47. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 8(b). In the 1985 report, the Task Force
recommended that the arbitration hearing be scheduled within 150 days of the
date of the last responsive pleading. N.C. BAR FouND. supra note 2, at 2. This
was based in part on Rule 8 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and
District Courts which provided, at the time, for a discovery period of 120 days.
Rule 8 has since been amended to require simply that discovery be initiated
"promptly."
48. "Pendency of a motion shall not be cause for delaying an arbitration
hearing unless the court so orders." N.C. CT.-ORD ARB. R. 3(q)2.
49. Arbitration hearings are generally limited to a one hour duration and the
law of evidence does not apply except as to privilege. Id. at R. 3(h), (n).
1999] 201
11
Fowler: Court-Ordered Arbitration in North Carolina: Selected Issues of P
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
binding nature of the arbitration award, 50 and the policies under-
lying the creation of mandatory court-ordered arbitration.51
Although a party may seek a continuance of the arbitration pend-
ing completion of discovery or a judge's ruling on a motion for
summary judgment,5 2 in most cases the purposes of court-ordered
arbitration are served by proceeding with the arbitration
hearing.53
Nevertheless it is possible for a party to raise its summary
judgment arguments before the arbitrator. First, Arbitration
Rule 3(q)(1) allows the court to "defer consideration of issues"
raised by a party's pre-trial motion "to the arbitrator for determi-
nation in his award."54 This rule allows a judge to decline tempo-
rarily to rule on a motion for summary judgment presented to her
prior to the arbitration hearing and to direct the party to present
the "issues" raised by the motion to the arbitrator. After the arbi-
tration hearing is completed and the arbitrator submits his
award, if neither party demands a trial de novo, the arbitration
award is entered as a judgment and the motion for summary judg-
ment becomes moot. If trial de novo is demanded then the motion
for summary judgment is still pending before the court and the
arbitration award is a nullity.55 Second, regardless of whether a
summary judgment motion is pending or a judge has expressly
50. Any party dissatisfied with the arbitration award may have a trial de novo
as of right. Id. at R. 5(a).
51. "The general goal of court-ordered arbitration is to create an efficient,
economical alternative to traditional civil litigation for prompt resolution of
cases. . . ." "Rather than heavy reliance on traditional discovery, full trial
preparation and briefing, and the rules of evidence, arbitration encourages
prehearing stipulations, relatively informal statements of issues, and receipt of
all relevant evidence that is assessed by the arbitrator for its relative worth."
Walker supra note 9, at 904. In the North Carolina Bar Association's report, the
authors state that "part of the possible benefit of court-ordered arbitration is in
simply having an established timetable for resolving the dispute. Imposing time
deadlines encourages the parties to at least consider resolving disputes more
quickly. ... [Tihe mere existence of a scheduled hearing on the merits helps
spur the parties and their attorneys to action." N.C. BAR ASS'N supra note 2, at
6.
52. Any motion for a continuance must be made to the court and not the
arbitrator, and the movant must demonstrate a strong and compelling reason for
the continuance. N.C. CT.-ORD ARB. R. 8(b)2.
53. "One goal of these rules is to expedite disposition of claims involving $
15,000 or less...." "A motion to continue a hearing will be heard by a judge
mindful of this goal." Id. at R. 8 (commentary).
54. Id. at R. 3(q).
55. See infra notes 7-10.
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deferred consideration of the motion to the arbitrator pursuant to
Rule 3(q)(1), the parties can always argue, and the arbitrator can
always consider, that a party is or is not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The arbitrator sits as both fact-finder and judge,
and appropriately considers legal bars to recovery.
This does not mean, however, that an arbitrator has authority
to grant a motion for summary judgment. The arbitrator's only
authority is to enter an arbitration award which "must resolve all
issues raised by the pleadings" and which requires no findings of
fact or conclusions of law.56 Arbitration Rule 3(q)(1) does not
authorize the judge to delegate to the arbitrator the authority to
decide the summary judgment motion, it only allows the arbitra-
tor to consider the issues raised by the motion when determining
the terms of the arbitration award. The arbitrator should hear
the legal' arguments and the evidence offered by each party within
the time constraints mandated by the arbitration rules and then
reach a decision as to what parties are entitled to recover and the
amount of such recovery. This decision can be based entirely on
conclusions of law or on applying the law to disputed facts but the
decision must be, in form and substance, an arbitration award as
defined by the rules.
Arbitration hearings are intended to be held at an early stage
of a litigation and to proceed as scheduled despite pending pre-
trial motions or outstanding discovery. The parties are not, how-
ever, prevented from arguing at the arbitration hearing the issues
underlying their pending or future summary judgment motion.
Although the arbitrator is not authorized to grant a motion for
summary judgment, the arbitrator can and should consider
whether a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in
determining the arbitration award.
B. The Pre-hearing Exchange of Information
Arbitration Rule 3(b) provides that at least ten days before
the arbitration hearing the parties shall exchange a list of the wit-
nesses each expects to call at the hearing, copies of exhibits each
expects to offer in evidence, and a brief statement of the issues
and the related contentions. 11 The Arbitration Rules do not spec-
ify the consequences if a party fails to file this Pre-hearing
Exchange of Information or if a party seeks to offer a witness or
56. N.C. CT.-ORD AaB. R. 4.
57. Id. at R. 3(b).
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exhibit at the hearing that was not listed on the Exchange of
Information. The Rules are reasonably interpreted, however, to
allow the presiding arbitrator the discretion to hear evidence even
if it was not properly included in the Exchange of Information.
The Rules direct the arbitrator to hear the evidence and argu-
ments of the parties within a sixty minute time period.5" To meet
this demanding limit, while allowing for full understanding of
each party's evidence and argument, the arbitrator must have and
must exercise control over the parties' presentations. Arbitration
Rule 3 provides for this authority. Subsection (g) gives arbitrators
"the authority of a trial judge to govern the conduct of hearings",59
except for the power of contempt. Subsection (h) provides that the
law of evidence is a guide but does not control what evidence the
arbitrator allows at the hearing.6 0 The arbitrator has discretion
to decide what evidence to hear and to consider "all evidence
presented" giving it the "weight and effect the arbitrator deter-
mines appropriate."6 1 The arbitrator is also not required to hear
"repetitive or cumulative evidence." 2 Rather than being bound to
exclude evidence on technical grounds, these provisions establish
that the arbitrator has wide discretion to hear or refuse to hear
evidence offered by the parties based upon the arbitrator's opinion
of the evidence's significance to resolution of the case. The fact
that the arbitrator is not required to exclude evidence for violation
of the rules of evidence supports the interpretation that the arbi-
trator is not required to exclude evidence that was not included in
the Pre-hearing Exchange of Information disclosure.
Thus technical grounds for exclusion of evidence are simply
factors, but not dispositive factors, the arbitrator should consider
in determining whether to hear that evidence. When a party has
failed to timely disclose the evidence it intends to offer at arbitra-
tion, the importance or significance of the evidence offered should
be balanced against the unfair or prejudicial effect of allowing the
evidence against the party against whom it is offered and the arbi-
trator's evaluation of the offering party's motives in failing to dis-
close the evidence. This conclusion is consistent with Arbitration
Rule 3(c) which provides that documents not properly exchanged
under Rule 3 are receivable into evidence unless "to do so would,
58. Id. at R. 3(n).
59. Id. at R. 3(g).
60. Id. at R. 3(h).
61. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(h).
62. Id. at R. 3(n)(2).
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in the arbitrator's opinion, constitute unfair, prejudicial sur-
prise."63 It would seem reasonable to apply this same rule to the
testimony of witnesses who were not listed on the Pre-hearing
Exchange of Information, i.e., that the arbitrator is not prevented
from allowing the witness to testify unless the arbitrator deter-
mines that the opposing party was unfairly prejudiced. This
might be the case if the opposing party can demonstrate that it
would have subpoenaed other witnesses or brought other evidence
to the hearing if it had known in advance what witnesses or evi-
dence the other party would offer at the hearing.
This conclusion is also consistent with subsections (b) and (1)
of Rule 3. The last sentence in subsection (b) is the only place in
the Rules that specifies a consequence for a general failure to com-
ply with the Pre-hearing Exchange of Information requirement.6 4
This consequence is not mandatory or even discretionary exclu-
sion of the evidence,65 but possible sanction under subsection (1).
Subsection (1) provides that a party failing to participate in the
arbitration proceeding "in a good faith and meaningful manner"
shall be subject to sanction by the court on motion of a party or
report of the arbitrator.66
The conclusion that admission of evidence at arbitration hear-
ings is always in the arbitrator's discretion is also supported by
the nature of court-ordered arbitration itself. As discussed above
in section II, any decision made by the arbitrator during the hear-
ing that a party did or did not comply with Rule 3(b) is not review-
able for error. In deciding whether or not to seek a trial de novo
the parties to an arbitration are likely to focus more on the specific
result contained in the arbitration award and their sense of the
63. Id. at R. 3(c).
64. Id. at R. 3(b).
65. Although the Rules themselves do not address this authority, the Official
Comment to Arbitration Rule 3 does state that failure to comply with the Pre-
hearing Exchange of Information requirement "may justify a sanction of limiting
of evidence otherwise admissible." N.C. CRT.-ORD. ARB. R. 3 (commentary). This
language clearly supports the interpretation that the arbitrator is not required to
exclude evidence simply because it was not included in the Pre-hearing
Exchange of Information, although suggesting that the arbitrator can apply a
"sanction" is inconsistent with subsection (1) which indicates sanctions should be
determined by "the court," i.e., a judge. Id. at 3(1). It also is more in keeping with
the goals of court-ordered arbitration to base decisions whether or not to exclude
evidence on fairness grounds rather than as a punishment/sanction for failure to
follow the rules.
66. N.C. CT.-ORB. ARB. R. 3(1).
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fairness of the proceeding. Arbitration is designed to give the par-
ties a chance to be heard and then propose a result which the par-
ties can either agree to or reject. The purpose of arbitration is
better served by allowing the parties to be heard rather than lim-
iting the relevant evidence presented because of technical viola-
tions of the Rules. Intentional violations of the Rules unless
deemed too unfair to the opposing party are best responded to
outside of the arbitration proceeding.
The Pre-hearing Exchange of Information mandated by Arbi-
tration Rule 3(b) is intended to be "exchanged" by the parties at
least ten days before the hearing and not filed with the court.6
Since there is no record made of the arbitration hearing and no
evidence of the arbitration is admissible at the trial de novo, there
is no reason to file the document. The parties may present their
Pre-hearing Exchange of Information to the arbitrator at the hear-
ing but the arbitrator should return such documents to the parties
at the conclusion of the hearing. The Official Comment to Arbitra-
tion Rule 3 states that the rule "contemplates that the arbitrator
shall return all evidence submitted when the hearing is concluded
and the award has been made."69 This should include the
Exchange of Information unless the arbitrator expressly incorpo-
rates it by reference into the award as the basis for the arbitra-
tor's recommendation of sanctions pursuant to Arbitration Rule
3(1).
It is not uncommon, however, for the arbitrator's copy of the
Pre-hearing Exchange of Information to find its way into the
clerk's file after the hearing. This document should not be
retained in the file. The parties should retrieve the copies submit-
ted to the arbitrator either at the hearing or after the award is
filed. If this is not done the arbitration coordinator or clerk should
promptly return the Exchange of Information found in the file to
the party that submitted it. As discussed above, this is because
the arbitration rules make clear that no evidence of the arbitra-
tion proceeding should be admitted in any subsequent proceeding.
67. The arbitration award is likely to be accepted by the parties only if each
party perceives the hearing as having been conducted fairly. While excluding
relevant evidence on technical grounds may undermine this perception of
fairness, allowing a party to violate the rules can do the same. Whether the
arbitrator decides to admit or exclude the evidence, the arbitrator should explain
the decision to the parties and focus on why such decision will result in a better
informed and more considered arbitration award.
68. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(b) (emphasis added).
69. Id. at R. 3 (commentary).
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In the post-arbitration de novo proceedings, parties have
attempted to use the Pre-hearing Exchange of Information of the
opposing party that was left in the clerk's file as an admission or
as an affidavit to support a motion for summary judgment. This
clearly violates the intent of the Arbitration Rules, yet once a part
of the court's file, the documents may not be subject to summary
removal. 7° The best practice is to ensure the return of the Pre-
hearing Exchange of Information to the party who submitted it at
the conclusion of the arbitration hearing.
C. Corporations Proceeding Pro Se at the Arbitration Hearing
Arbitration Rule 3(p) provides that all parties shall be present
at the arbitration hearing, in person or through a representative,
and that although all parties may be represented by counsel,
"[oinly individuals may appear pro se."7 1 This is consistent with
the rule in many states that corporations can be represented in
court only by an attorney admitted to the practice of law. 72 North
Carolina does not, however, appear to follow the majority rule.
The incongruous result is that in North Carolina corporations may
represent themselves in proceedings before a magistrate, a dis-
trict or superior court judge, but not in court-ordered arbitration
proceedings. The author is unable to formulate any basis for
treating arbitration differently from other court proceedings in
this regard. Elimination of this limitation in Rule 3(p) should be
considered.
The conclusion that North Carolina law permits corporations
to proceed pro se is based on several appellate opinions interpret-
ing the relevant statutes 73 and the formal opinion of the Con-
70. According to an AOC Records Officer, the clerk should properly refuse to
file a Pre-Hearing Exchange of Information prior to arbitration and that if such
document is left in the court file after arbitration the clerk should properly
dispose of the document once a party has made a demand for trial de novo or final
judgment has been entered.
71. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(p).
72. 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2172 (1986); C.D. Sumner, Annotation, 19
A.L.R. 3d 1073, Propriety and Effect of Corporation's Appearance Pro Se,
Through Agent Who Is Not Attorney (1968); see also Lier, Representation of a
Corporation by Its Lay Employees, 5 J. LEGAL PROF. 217, 225. (1980).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-11 (1996) states that a "party may appear either in
person or by an attorney in actions or proceedings in which he is interested." Id.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-2 (1995) defines the practice of law and N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 84-4 (1995) defines the unauthorized practice of law.
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sumer Protection Committee of the North Carolina State Bar.74
In State v. Pledger,75 the court held that a lay person who is an
officer, agent or employee of a corporation may prepare legal docu-
ments for the corporation when the corporation has a primary
interest in the transaction for which the documents are prepared,
since his act is the act of the corporation in furtherance of its own
business. Thus the lay person did not violate section 84-4 which
provided that it "shall be unlawful for any person.., except mem-
bers of the Bar ... prepare for another person, firm or corporation,
any . . . legal document," because the corporation for which he
worked was not "another" corporation within the meaning of the
statute. 76 If a corporation's lay employees can perform legal serv-
ices for the corporation in the course of their employment, can
those legal services include representation of the corporation in
court? This issue was mentioned but not resolved in Gardner v.
N.C. State Bar.77 Gardner stated that "Pledger is not authority
for the proposition that a corporation may appear in court for
someone else."7  By implication Pledger could then stand for the
proposition that the corporation can appear in court for itself.
In Duke Power Co. v. Daniels,7 9 the corporate plaintiffs lay
employee signed the complaint filed in the small claims action.
The court of appeals found that the plaintiff corporation had not
practiced law in violation of section 84-5 because the main pur-
pose of the statute was to prohibit corporations "from performing
legal services for others."80 The Daniels court also noted that the
expediency and simplicity of the small claims court system was
intended to benefit "corporate as well as individual" citizens-
including the option to use the forum "without obtaining a lawyer,
if they choose to do so.""'
Based on Pledger and Daniels, the Consumer Protection Com-
mittee of the North Carolina State Bar has determined that a non-
attorney employee of a corporation may represent the corporation
in proceedings in small claims court, district and superior court
and that such representation does not constitute the unauthorized
74. Letter from Daniel B. Dean to Thomas Fowler (July 28 1998) (on file with
the Campbell Law Review).
75. 257 N.C. 634, 127 S.E.2d 337 (1962).
76. Id. at 638
77. 316 N.C. 285, 341 S.E.2d 517 (1986).
78. Id. at 291.
79. 86 N.C. App. 469, 358 S.E.2d 87 (1987).
80. Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
81. Id.
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practice of law. In response to a question from the author, the
Committee expressly stated that: "[iun the absence of Rule 3(p) of
the Rules for Court Ordered Arbitration in North Carolina, the
Committee would not interpret section 84-4 as prohibiting an
employee of a corporation from appearing on behalf of the corpora-
tion in District Court arbitration. "82
Corporations should be represented by an attorney at arbitra-
tion hearings not because representation by a lay employee would
be an unauthorized practice of law but because Arbitration Rule
3(p) expressly forbids such representation. Until Rule 3(p) is
changed it should be followed. It is not unreasonable, however, to
argue as in Section III, B above, that violation of a provision of
Arbitration Rule 3 should not necessarily require exclusion of that
party's evidence. For instance, if a corporate defendant appears at
the arbitration hearing without an attorney, is the arbitrator
required to prohibit the corporate defendant from cross-examining
plaintiff's witnesses, presenting evidence and arguing its conten-
tions to the arbitrator? Such a result would seem to damage need-
lessly the purpose and usefulness of the arbitration hearing.
Perhaps, following the analysis in Section III, B, the arbitrator
should have discretion to waive the requirement of Rule 3(p) or
perhaps the opposing party might agree to waive the rule in order
to have a meaningful hearing. If so, such waiver would not
involve the unauthorized practice of law.
D. Arbitration Awards by Arbitrators
There is no requirement that the written arbitration award
contain any findings of fact, conclusions of law or statements sup-
porting the award.8 3 The written award must, however, resolve all
issues raised by the pleadings"4 in order for it to serve as the basis
for the consent judgment that the court will enter if neither party
files a demand for a trial de novo within the time allowed. Thus in
every case the award should specify the amount, if any, to be paid
by each party.
If a plaintiff or defendant, or both, fail to appear at the arbi-
tration hearing, the arbitrator should nevertheless proceed with
the hearing and reach a decision based on the evidence
82. See infra notes 17, 63.
83. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 4(b).
84. Id. at R. 4(c).
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presented.85 The arbitrator should not continue the hearing, enter
a default or default judgment, or decline to rule on the matter
because of a party's absence. Scheduling, rescheduling and con-
tinuing an arbitration case are matters for the court and not the
arbitrator, 6 as are entry of defaults.8 7 If a party failed to appear
at the arbitration hearing for reasons beyond the party's control,
the party must move for a rehearing before the court and not the
arbitrator, within the time allowed for demanding the trial de
novo.
8 8
Arbitration awards that do not make any award but instead
state that "[tihe arbitrator could not make an award due to the
absence of [defendant] and the insufficiency of the record" or that
"[n]either party was present for hearing [and] [a]rbitrator waited
entire hour and no one showed" are problematic.8 9 First, the arbi-
trator should have made an award based on the evidence
presented at the hearing whether or not either party or both par-
ties appeared and presented any evidence. Second, it is not clear
where the case stands procedurally after this "award." Either
85. Id. at R. 3(j). Thus if plaintiff fails to appear and present evidence, the
plaintiff will have failed to carry the burden of proof and should be awarded
nothing by the arbitrator. This rule is consistent with that followed in
Pennsylvania, the state with the oldest court-ordered arbitration program.
According to the Explanatory Note to the Pennsylvania Rules of Compulsory
Arbitration: "When a case is called for hearing, if the plaintiff appears but the
defendant does not, the arbitrators shall hear the case and proceed to an award
Conversely, if the defendant appears but the plaintiff does not, the
arbitrators shall enter an award in favor of the defendant. If plaintiff appears
but fails to prove a claim, the arbitrators, without hearing the defendant, shall
likewise enter an award for defendant." PA. Comp. ARB. R. * (date).
86. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 8(b). The author agrees with language in the
Benchbook for Arbitrators that states that "[the Rules recognize the exclusive
authority of the court to schedule and to continue hearings .... " ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE CoURTs, BENCHBOOK FOR ARBITRATORS 2 (1997). The author disagrees
with, or at least considers misleading, the statements on page 4, of the
Benchbook, that if a party fails to appear or appears unprepared that the
arbitrator has the option of "considering a continuance" or "canceling the
hearing and reporting the facts to the court." Id. at 4. In the author's opinion,
the arbitrator's only option is to proceed with the hearing and to enter an award
based on the evidence presented. Motions for continuances and for re-hearings
must be addressed to the court.
87. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(j).
88. Id.
89. These examples were taken verbatim from actual awards entered by
arbitrators on the AOC form.
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party might move for a rehearing pursuant to Rule 3(j) 9" or might
demand a trial de novo pursuant to Rule 5(a),91 but what is the
status of the case if neither party takes any action prior to the
expiration of thirty days from the arbitrator's "award?"
Judgment cannot be entered on the "award" because what the
arbitrator stated cannot be construed as a judgment. The judge
might order a rehearing sua sponte but there is no evidence that
any failure to appear was "beyond the party's control" as required
by Rule 3(j).9 2 If it was the plaintiff who failed to appear, an invol-
untary dismissal on failure to prosecute grounds might be consid-
ered, however, there may be insufficient evidence to justify such
an order. A final option might be to find that the failures to
appear coupled with the arbitrator's actions constituted strong
and compelling reason to exempt the case from arbitration so that
the matter would proceed to district court following the standards
of Rule 1(d).93
A similar problem can occur when the arbitrator attempts to
mediate the case before her. As discussed in Section I, mediation
differs significantly from arbitration and an arbitrator assigned to
preside at a court-ordered arbitration is not authorized to trans-
form the proceeding into a mediated settlement conference as
defined in section 7A-38.1. That does not mean, however, that the
arbitrator is not authorized during the arbitration proceedings to
encourage and to participate in the parties' settlement negotia-
tions. Although the Arbitration Rules do not expressly grant this
authority to the arbitrator, the Official Comment to Arbitration
Rule 3 provides that an arbitrator may "at any time" allow settle-
ment negotiations and may participate "if all parties are present
in person or by counsel."94 This authority is consistent with the
view that an arbitrator presides at the hearing with the same
authority that a judge would have except for the power of con-
tempt.95 In general, a judge has authority to encourage settle-
ment discussions.96
90. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(j).
91. Id. at R. 5(a).
92. Id. at R. 3(j).
93. Id. at R. 1(d).
94. Id. at R. 3 (commentary).
95. "[Tlhe arbitrator has the authority of a judge except for the contempt
power." N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 2 (commentary).
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-16 (1990); compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021(a)
(1997) (trial judge is authorized to participate in plea bargain discussions).
1999] 211
21
Fowler: Court-Ordered Arbitration in North Carolina: Selected Issues of P
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Thus, if the parties are in agreement, the arbitrator might
decide to utilize a part of the time allowed for the arbitration hear-
ing to investigate a settlement, and might briefly undertake the
role of mediator. But it is still an arbitration hearing that must
result in an arbitration award. If the parties reach a settlement
at the arbitration hearing, with or without the help of the arbitra-
tor, it will remain the parties' responsibility to file a stipulation of
dismissal or consent judgment within 20 days after the arbitration
award is entered.9 7 The arbitrator must enter an award based on
the evidence, stipulations or representations of the parties. The
award might be that plaintiff recover nothing or it might be for the
amount of the settlement. If subsequently the parties fail to fol-
low through with their settlement and dismissal, the aggrieved
party must either accept the arbitration award or file a timely
demand for trial de novo and pursue any appropriate claims for
compromise and settlement, or accord and satisfaction. Even if
the parties prepare and execute a settlement agreement during
the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator is not authorized to dismiss
the case; the arbitrator must enter an award."
If a plaintiff or defendant, or both, fail to appear at the arbi-
tration hearing, the arbitrator should nevertheless proceed with
the hearing and reach a decision based on the evidence presented
even if no evidence is presented.9 9 The arbitrator is not author-
ized to continue or cancel the arbitration hearing, or otherwise
avoid entering an award in the matter properly set for
arbitration. 100
97. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 2(a)(2).
98. An arbitrator who dismisses a case without entering an award may not be
entitled to the seventy-five dollar fee. Rule 2(c) of the Rules for Court-Ordered
Arbitration states that arbitrators shall be paid for each hearing "when they file
their awards with the court." Additionally, it is clear that the arbitrator who
transforms the arbitration hearing into a mediation, even if the mediation lasts
several hours and even if the mediation results in a successful settlement of the
matter, is entitled only to be paid as an arbitrator and not as a mediator
pursuant to the Rules Implementing Mediated Settlement Conferences in
Superior Court Civil Actions. See N.C. SUPER. CT. MED. SET. CONF. R. 7(B)
(parties shall pay mediator a $ 100 administrative fee and an hourly rate of $ 100
for the mediation.).
99. Compare I.L.C.S. S.CT. R. 91 (1998) ("The arbitration hearing shall
proceed in the absence of any party who, after due notice, fails to be present. The
panel shall require the other party or parties to submit such evidence as the
panel may require for the making of an award.").
100. Several states' arbitration rules expressly provide that a party who fails to
appear at the arbitration hearing waives its right to demand trial de novo. See
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E. Consideration and Award by Arbitrator of Attorney's Fee
Claim
Section 6-21.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes pro-
vides that in a personal injury or property damage suit where the
judgment of recovery for damages is ten thousand dollars or less,
the "presiding judge" may, in his discretion, allow plaintiffs attor-
ney a reasonable attorney fee for representing plaintiff in the law-
suit.101 Because of a 1992 Court of Appeals case, Bass v. Goss, °2
there has been some question as to whether a plaintiff who
prevails at arbitration in a small personal injury case may ask for
and the arbitrator may award an attorney's fee as authorized by
section 6-21.1. The issue was specifically addressed in a recent
North Carolina Court of Appeals case, Taylor v. Cadle, 03 in which
the court clearly stated that the arbitrator had the authority to
award attorney's fees. But the Taylor decision is inconsistent
with the holding in Bass and some of the statements in Taylor
could be interpreted as dicta. For these reasons it is useful to
review both cases and the policies behind court-ordered
arbitration.
Court-ordered arbitration is intended to be "an efficient, eco-
nomical alternative to traditional litigation for prompt resolution
of disputes involving money damage claims."104 If at the arbitra-
tion hearing the plaintiff seeks attorney's fees and the arbitrator
resolves the matter and includes the amount in her award10 5 then
each party can determine whether or not to appeal based on com-
plete knowledge of its total liability or recovery. If no party
I.L.C.S. S.CT. R. 91 ("The failure of a party to be present, either in person or by
counsel, at an arbitration hearing shall constitute a waiver of the right to reject
the award and a consent to the entry by the court of a judgment on the award.");
17B A.R.S. UNIF. ARB. R. 4(j), ("Failure to appear at a hearing or to participate in
good faith at a hearing... shall constitute a waiver of the right to appeal absent
a showing of good cause."); WASH. SUPER. CT. MAR 5.4 ("A party who fails to
participate [in the arbitration hearing] without good cause waives the right to a
trial de novo.").
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21.1 (1998).
102. 105 N.C.App. 242, 412 S.E.2d 145 (1992).
103. __ N.C.App. -, 502 S.E.2d 692 (8-4-1998).
104. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 1 (commentary); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-37.1(a); see
generally, George K. Walker, Court-Ordered Arbitration Comes to North
Carolina and the Nation, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 901, 904 (1986)("The general
goal of court-ordered arbitration is to create an efficient, economical alternative
to traditional civil litigation for prompt resolution of cases .. ")
105. The AOC Arbitration Award and Judgment Form, AOC-CV-802, includes
a space for the award of attorney's fees.
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appeals within thirty days, the case is resolved and there are no
further hearings. 10 6 If there is an appeal, both the liability issue
and the attorney's fee issue will be relitigated de novo. 1°0
If, on the other hand, the plaintiff does not seek attorney's
fees at the arbitration hearing and the matter is not addressed by
the arbitrator, the total liability or recovery is not known before
the decision to appeal must be made, and, in any event, a further
hearing must be scheduled before a District or Superior Court
judge to hear the section 6-21.1 motion. Such a result undermines
court-ordered arbitration's ability to resolve disputes efficiently,
economically and promptly.
The Arbitration Rules direct the arbitrator to "resolve all
issues raised by the pleadings" in her award.' Indeed, in the
Official Comment to Rule 3, the court is directed to "defer to the
arbitrator's consideration motions addressed to the merits of a
claim requiring a hearing [or] the taking of evidence. .".."'0o The
clear spirit of the Rules for Court-Ordered Arbitration is that the
arbitrator is exercising the delegated authority of the trial judge
to resolve all matters, except contempt, that would arise if a regu-
lar trial was held." 0 The Arbitration Rules themselves, then, cou-
pled with the liberal construction of section 6-21.1 required by
case-law,"' support a conclusion that the arbitrator is functioning
as the "presiding judge" as that phrase is used in section 6-21.1
and thus has authority to include in the arbitration award attor-
ney's fees.
The court of appeals decision in Bass v. Goss,12 does not con-
flict with this analysis of the Arbitration Rules because Bass did
not address the authority of an arbitrator to award attorney's fees
pursuant to section 6-21.1. Bass was a personal injury claim,
brought in Superior Court, in which the arbitrator awarded the
plaintiff $ 2,559 in damages. 1 13 Although the plaintiff had asked
for reasonable attorney's fees in her complaint, the plaintiffs
attorney did not expressly ask the arbitrator at the hearing for
106. N.C. Cw.-ORD. ARB. R. 6(b).
107. Id. at R. 5(a).
108. Id. at R. 4(c).
109. Id. at R. 3 (commentary).
110. See N.C. CT.-Om. Aim. R. 3(g) (Arbitrators shall have the authority of a
trial judge to govern the conduct of hearings).
111. Hicks v. Albertson, 284 N.C. 236, 239, 200 S.E.2d 40 (1973).
112. 105 N.C.App. 242, 412 S.E.2d 145 (1992).
113. Id. at 243, 412 S.E.2d at 145.
[Vol. 21:191214
24
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol21/iss2/2
COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION
attorney's fees pursuant to section 6-21.1."' Although the arbi-
trator did not consider the substance of the attorney's fee request,
the arbitrator did draw a horizontal line through the blank on the
arbitration award that indicates the amount of attorney's fees
awarded. Neither party filed for a trial de novo within the thirty
day limit and judgment was entered on the award. The plaintiffs
attorney then moved for attorney's fees under section 6-21.1
before the superior court. The superior court judge denied the
motion pending a remand back to the arbitrator for a determina-
tion of the costs. 115 The plaintiff appealed this denial of his
motion. On remand, the arbitrator declined to consider the
motion for attorney's fees on the basis that under Arbitration Rule
2(c) the filing of the award is the final act of the arbitrator and the
arbitrator has no authority to reopen a matter or hold subsequent
hearings.1 1 6
On appeal the defendant argued that the arbitrator had the
power to award attorney's fees and the plaintiff had the opportu-
nity to ask the arbitrator for the award, but having failed to do so
and having failed to appeal the arbitrator's award, the plaintiff
was barred from making a subsequent section 6-21.1 motion for
attorney's fees and was limited to the recovery specified in the
arbitration award. The plaintiffs position was that the arbitrator
never had the power to award attorney's fees and that such award
was the exclusive province of the Superior Court Judge. The Bass
opinion adopted neither of these positions.
In Bass, the court held that "the judge has discretion whether
to and in what amount to award attorney's fees in this type of
case." 1 The Bass opinion does not state that the arbitrator has
no authority to award attorney's fees. Indeed, as there was no
award of attorney's fees by the arbitrator in the Bass case, the
Court of Appeals had no reason to consider the validity of such an
award. Because the Court was not concerned with the validity of
a hypothetical award of attorney's fees by an arbitrator there was
no need to interpret or refer to the Rules for Court Ordered Arbi-
tration which are not mentioned in the opinion. The opinion does
state that the "action of the arbitrator after... 13 December 1990
114. Id.
115. Id. at 243, 412 S.E.2d at 146.
116. See N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 2, (commentary); William Kinsland Edwards,
Note, "No Frills Justice". North Carolina Experiments With Court-Ordered
Arbitration, 66 N.C.L.Rev. 395, 408 (1988).
117. 105 N.C. App. 242, 244, 412 S.E.2d 145, 146 (1992).
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was a nullity."11 However, this holding was procedural only.
Notice of appeal of the superior court judge's order had already
been entered, thus depriving the trial courts of jurisdiction to pro-
ceed-and not a denial of the arbitrator's substantive authority to
award attorney's fees. Finally, as noted above, even upon remand
from the superior court judge the arbitrator did not award attor-
ney's fees.119
Thus Bass did not address, in dicta or otherwise, the author-
ity of arbitrators to award attorney's fees. Bass does establish
that the rights created by section 6-21.1 are not lost simply
because the plaintiff failed to avail himself of the opportunity to
seek the award at arbitration. Bass does allow the plaintiffs
attorney to present his motion for attorney's fees pursuant to sec-
tion 6-21.1 to a district or superior court judge subsequent to the
arbitration hearing if the issue was not raised and resolved at the
arbitration hearing. 2 ° Nevertheless, Bass was interpreted by
many to prohibit the practice of arbitrators of including attorney's
fees in their arbitration awards. The Administrative Office of the
Courts promulgated a memorandum, on February 7, 1992, in
response to Bass that was distributed to court officials and con-
cluded that the award of reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to
section 6-21.1 was "not subject to arbitration under the Rules of
Court Ordered Arbitration." 21
In Taylor v. Cadle, 22 the arbitrator awarded damages to
plaintiff in an amount less than $ 10,000. At the arbitration hear-
ing, the plaintiff asked for and presented evidence on his claim for
attorney's fees pursuant to section 6-21.1, but the arbitrator
118. Id.
119. The arbitrator's order of February 8, 1991, on remand from the superior
court judge stated: "It appearing to the court that the motion for attorney's fees
should have been made at the time the Arbitration Hearing was held; Plaintiff
now seeks further arbitration which is contrary to Arbitration Rules." This is
consistent with the position advocated in the Benchbook for Arbitrators which
states "the rules do not permit motions for reconsideration or modification of an
award by an arbitrator after it is filed . . .. An arbitrator is relieved of all
responsibility in a case when the award is filed." ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS
supra note 87, at 7.
120. 105 N.C. App. 242, 244, 412 S.E.2d 145, 146 (1992).
121. Memorandum from AOC Counsel Thomas J. Andrews to Kathy Shuart
(February 7, 1992) (on file with Campbell Law Review), advising arbitrators that
"motions for attorney's fees under section 6-21.1 must be heard by a judge of the
trial division in which the case is pending."
122. __ N.C.App. __, 502 S.E.2d 692 (1998).
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declined to award attorney's fees. 123 The arbitrator indicated his
decision on the AOC Arbitration Award and Judgment Form,
AOC-CV-802, by a horizontal line drawn through the blank space
for attorney's fees. 124 Neither party timely appealed the arbitra-
tor's decision and the chief district court judge entered judgment
adopting the award. The defendant then paid the judgment and
the clerk noted the judgment satisfied on the judgment docket. 125
Approximately one month later the plaintiff filed a motion for
attorney's fees under section 6-21.1.
The motion for attorney's fees was heard in district court.
The district court judge awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiff
and appeared to base this decision on two grounds: first, that the
arbitrator had not considered plaintiffs substantive claim for
attorneys fees but instead had felt compelled to refuse considera-
tion of the claim based on the "AOC policy set forth in its Memo-
randum of February 7, 1992"; and second, that in adopting the
arbitrator's award the chief district judge had made no findings of
fact with regard to the attorney's fee claim, that such findings of
fact were required, and that the judgment was thus subject to cor-
rection pursuant to Rule 60 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 26
The court of appeals tackled the important issue not
addressed in Bass by reversing the trial court's award of attor-
ney's fees and expressly interpreting the Rules for Court-Ordered
Arbitration to authorize the arbitrator to "decide all monetary
claims raised by the pleadings.., including those claims for attor-
ney's fees and costs where permitted by law"' 27- the important
issue not addressed in Bass. The remainder of the court's holding
in Taylor, however, was more obscure.
The Taylor court did not address the trial court's determina-
tion that the arbitrator's decision not to award attorney's fees was
based on the arbitrator's conclusion that he lacked jurisdiction to
consider such an award.' 28 As a general rule, when a motion
addressed to the discretion of the court is denied upon the ground
that the court has no power to grant the motion in its discretion,
123. Id. at 693.
124. Id.
125. This also occurred in Bass, i.e., the defendant paid the judgment as
entered by the court and the clerk marked it paid in full-prior to any award of
attorney's fees.
126. __ N.C.App. -, 502 S.E.2d 692, 693-694 (1998).
127. Id. at 696.
128. Id. at 693.
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the ruling is reviewable. 129 The court's silence on this issue is,
however, not inconsistent with the analysis in Section II above
that errors by the arbitrator, even errors as to jurisdiction, are not
directly reviewable on appeal but only by seeking a trial de novo.
The Taylor court purports to avoid conflict with Bass by limit-
ing Bass to its facts, but the salient facts of Bass and Taylor
appear indistinguishable. Both were personal injury cases in
which plaintiffs had the opportunity to request an award of attor-
ney's fees under section 6-21.1 at the arbitration. 130 In each case,
the arbitrator did not consider the substance of the plaintiff's
attorney's fee request- in Bass because plaintiff failed to raise the
matter at the hearing, and in Taylor because the arbitrator con-
cluded he had no authority to consider the request. In each case,
the arbitrator drew a horizontal line through the attorney's fee
blank on the arbitration award form. In each case, the plaintiff
did not appeal the arbitrator's award but later, after the arbitra-
tor's award was adopted and entered as a judgment, each plaintiff
moved for a judge to award the attorney's fees. The Bass court
held that the judge had the authority to consider and award attor-
ney's fees while the Taylor court found the judge lacked this
authority. If this analysis is correct, then the Taylor holding in
this regard should not stand because the Supreme Court has held
that a panel of the Court of Appeals is bound by a prior decision of
another panel of the same court addressing the same question, but
in a different case, unless that decision has been overturned by a
higher court. 131
Taylor's resolution of the findings of fact issue is also less
than satisfactory. Plaintiff had argued and the trial judge had
agreed that case law required findings of fact to support any
award of attorney's fees under section 6-21.1.132 Because the chief
district court judge's judgment adopting the arbitration award did
not include such findings of fact, the trial judge held that the judg-
ment was "correctable under Rule 60(a)."' 33 This conclusion
appears erroneous on several grounds.
129. Calloway v. Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 189 S.E.2d 484 (1972).
130. In each case the plaintiffs complaint included a request for an award of
reasonable attorney's fees.
131. In The Matter of Appeal From Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 383, 379 S.E.2d
30 (1989).
132. __ N.C.App. -, 502 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1998).
133. Id.
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First, Arbitration Rule 6(b) requires the clerk or the court to
enter judgment on the arbitrator's award if no timely demand for
trial de novo is filed.1 3 4 There is no authority to modify or alter the
arbitrator's award; indeed the chief district court judge, having
heard no evidence, could not have made any findings of fact with
regard to the attorney's fees or any other aspect of the case. Any
requirement that the chief district court judge's judgment on the
arbitrator's award contain findings of fact would amount to a
requirement that the arbitrator's award contain findings of fact,
which would contradict the express language of Arbitration Rule
4(b). 135
Second, the cases that require findings of fact to support
attorney's fees awards address situations and concerns clearly dis-
tinguishable from arbitration proceedings. In United Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Kuykendall,136 the court explained that without
findings of fact as to the time and labor expended, the skill
required, the customary fee for like work, and the experience or
ability of the attorney, the reviewing court is unable to make a
determination as to the reasonableness of the trial court's award
of attorney's fees. Such findings of fact are unnecessary in arbi-
tration awards that are adopted by the court because such judg-
ments are not subject to review by an appellate court. The
judgment so entered has "the same effect as a consent judg-
ment,"'3 v and by so consenting, the parties waive their right to
appeal. 138
Unfortunately the Taylor court did not choose to resolve this
issue on the grounds set forth above. Instead Taylor reasoned
that United Laboratories required findings of fact regarding the
basis for attorney's fees only if attorney's fees were actually
awarded and that since, on the facts in Taylor, no attorney's fees
were awarded by either the arbitrator or the judge, there was no
requirement that the chief district court judge's judgment contain
findings of fact. 139 While narrowly resolving the Taylor facts, this
holding is based on the premise that United Laboratories applies
to arbitration awards that the parties have consented to and to
which the parties have waived any right to appeal. Thus when an
134. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 6(b).
135. Id. at R. 4(b).
136. 102 N.C. APP. 484, 403 S.E.2d 104 (1991)
137. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 6(b).
138. Id. at R. 6 (commentary).
139. Taylor, _ N.C.App. -, 502 S.E.2d 692, 696 (1998).
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arbitration award includes an award of attorneys fees but no find-
ings of fact, and that award is properly entered as a judgment pur-
suant to Arbitration Rule 6(b), it is expected that parties will
argue the Taylor rationale as a basis to challenge the attorney's
fee award. In these situations, the Taylor holding should be
restricted to its facts, that is that findings of fact are unnecessary
when there is no award of attorneys fees. These cases should be
resolved by determining that United Laboratories does not apply
to arbitration awards that the parties have consented to and to
which the parties have waived any right to appeal.
The arbitration rules give the arbitrator authority to include
attorney's fees, if otherwise appropriate, in the arbitration award.
This conclusion is consistent with both Bass and Taylor. 4 °
Despite arguments to the contrary that can be inferred from cer-
tain analysis in Taylor, there is no requirement that the arbitra-
tor include in his or her award findings of fact concerning the
reasonableness of the attorney's fee award. There remains some
uncertainty as to the authority of a judge to consider, post-arbitra-
tion, a motion for attorney's fees. Even if Bass and Taylor are not
harmonizable, however, some conclusions appear sound. If the
arbitration award indicates that the arbitrator considered the
attorney's fee request and exercised his or her discretion to grant
or deny the request, then that award or denial, if entered as a
judgment upon the parties' failure to timely seek a trial de novo,
should be res judicata on that issue.14 ' A judge should not reopen
140. Because in neither case did the arbitrator actually award attorney's fees it
is arguable that neither case could have held that the arbitrator has authority to
award attorney's fees. The holding in Taylor, narrowly construed, could be
simply that it was error to use Rule 60 of the N.C. Rules of Civil Procedure to
correct a Kuykendall error when Kuykendall was not applicable so that there
was no Kuykendall error. Even if dictum, however, Taylor's statement that
arbitrators have this authority is a sound interpretation of the Arbitration Rules
and should be followed. Trustees of Rowan Tech. v. Hammond Assoc., 313 N.C.
230, 242 (1985) (stating that dictum is properly considered if it logically assists in
answering the new question).
141. If no timely demand for trial de novo is filed, the arbitration award is
entered as a consent judgment and consent judgments are generally entitled to
claim preclusive, although not issue preclusive effect. "[A consent] judgment
results from a.basically contractual agreement of the parties .... [Ilt is to be
enforced in accord with the intent of the parties .... The basically contractual
nature of consent judgments has led to general agreement that preclusive effects
should be measured by the intent of the parties. In most circumstances, it is
recognized that consent agreements ordinarily are intended to preclude any
further litigation on the claim presented but are not intended to preclude further
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a matter that has been finally resolved. Even if the arbitrator did
not expressly consider the attorney's fee claim, as was the case in
both Bass and Taylor, the matter could still be considered finally
resolved under res judicata principles because the plaintiffs had
the opportunity to ask for attorney's fees at the arbitration but
failed to do so.' 42 It is also reasonable to conclude that the de facto
settlement, which results when no party seeks trial de novo
within the time allowed, has conditions that are implied by law;
and that one of these conditions is that all issues raised by the
pleadings will be deemed resolved by the arbitration award.143
Although not articulated by the Taylor court, these rationales
seem supportive of and consistent with the ultimate Taylor con-
clusion that: "Whenever a party requests attorney's fees and the
arbitrator awards or denies attorney's fees or fails to consider the
issue, the dissatisfied party must timely appeal the award, even
though it is satisfactory in all other respects. Failure of the dis-
satisfied party to timely preserve the issue will result in a waiver
of this issue on appeal."1 44 In any event, court-ordered arbitration
is clearly more efficient and economical when all relevant issues
are presented by the parties, considered by the arbitrator and
resolved by the arbitration award.
This was also the conclusion of an Illinois appellate court
which considered the issue. In Kolar v. Arlington Toyota,'45
although the plaintiffs had asked for attorney fees in their com-
litigation on any of the issues presented. Thus consent judgments ordinarily
support claim preclusion but not issue preclusion." Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure, Stipulations and Consent Judgments, § 4443, at 383-88
(1998). Because in Taylor the parties waived their right to appeal, the
arbitration award became a final judgment on the merits and thus a proper
subject for res judicata principles. Compare First Union National Bank v.
Richards, 90 N.C. App. 650, 653, 369 S.E.2d 620 (1988) (holding that
magistrate's judgment was not entitled to res judicata consideration because it
was not a final judgment as party had demanded trial de novo).
142. See Caswell Realty Associates I v. Andrews Company, 128 N.C. App. 716,
496 S.E.2d 607 (1998) (strict identity of issues is not absolutely required and the
doctrine of res judicata has been accordingly expanded to apply to those issues
which could have been raised in the prior action but were not); Kabatnik v.
Westminster Co., 63 N.C. App. 708, 306 S.E.2d 513 (1983).
143. Thus the de facto settlement option allowed under court-ordered
arbitration carries with it the presumption that the parties intended that all
issues raised by the pleadings be resolved by the arbitration award which
became a consent judgment when neither party sought trial de novo.
144. __ N.C. App. -, 502 S.E.2d 692, 696 (1998).
145. 675 N.E.2d 963 (1996).
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plaint, they did not request attorney fees at the court-ordered
arbitration hearing. Neither party sought trial de novo within the
time allowed and the court entered the arbitrator's award as the
judgment in the case. Plaintiffs then filed a petition for attorney
fees in the circuit court and the court granted the petition award-
ing $ 8,323 in attorney fees.146 The defendant appealed and the
appellate court reversed the trial court. Kolar held that the arbi-
tration award is "an all or nothing proposition, that must either be
accepted or rejected in its entirety." 147 The court based this con-
clusion on Illinois' arbitration rules that provide that the arbitra-
tion award shall dispose of all claims for relief. 148 The court noted
that the main goal of the arbitration process was to reach a final
resolution of the dispute, not to allow piecemeal resolution of
issues. 149
F. Consideration and Award by Arbitrator of Punitive Damages
or Unfair Trade Practice Claims
Pursuant to Arbitration Rule 1(a) all civil actions are subject
to court-ordered arbitration except: (1) class actions; (2) claims for
injunctive or declaratory relief; (3) cases involving family law, title
to real estate, wills and decedents' estates, or summary ejectment;
(4) special proceedings; (5) claims for damages in an unspecified
amount "in excess" of $ 10,000 in compliance with Rule 8(a)(2) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure; (6) claims for damages in an unspeci-
fied amount if the claimant certifies the claim will actually exceed
$ 15,000; and (7) claims certified by a party to be related to similar
actions pending in other courts. 150 Civil actions that are other-
wise subject to court-ordered arbitration are not exempted simply
because they include claims for punitive damages or unfair trade
practice. Upon its own motion or the motion of a party, the court
can exempt any civil action from court-ordered arbitration includ-
ing actions that include claims for punitive damages or unfair
trade practice. However, the basis for the exemption must be
either that the monetary claims exceed $ 15,000 or that there is
some other "strong and compelling reason" to exempt the claim. 151
The decision to exempt is made by the district court or superior
146. Id. at 964.
147. Id., at 965.
148. I.L.C.S. S.CT. R. 92(b); see also I.L.C.S. S.CT. R. 92(a).
149. Kolar, 675 N.E.2d at 965.
150. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 1(a).
151. Id. at R. 1(d).
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court judge, 15 2 prior to the arbitration hearing.'53 The parties
should not raise exemption issues at the arbitration hearing and
exemptions under Rule 1(a) or (d) should not be considered by the
arbitrator at the arbitration hearing.
G. Demand for Trial De Novo: Several Issues
Suppose plaintiff has sued two defendants, the arbitrator has
ruled that the defendants are jointly and severally liable to plain-
tiff for a sum certain, but that each party is dissatisfied with the
award and each has decided to demand a trial de novo if the mat-
ter cannot be settled. Plaintiff files written demand for trial de
novo and pays the seventy-five dollar filing fee to the clerk. Satis-
fied that the matter will be retried and preferring to avoid paying
another seventy-five dollar filing fee the defendants do not file a
written demand for trial de novo. After the thirtieth day from the
date the award is filed has expired, the first defendant learns that
plaintiff and the second defendant have reached a settlement and
that plaintiff has filed notice that it has withdrawn its demand for
trial de novo. Will the arbitration award be entered as a judgment
against the first defendant?
Although neither the Rules nor the related statutes expressly
allow a party to withdraw a filed demand for trial de novo, this is
probably an option within the thirty days after the arbitrator's
award has been filed. As a general rule, an appellant has the
right to dismiss an appeal with leave of court although such right
is not absolute but is subject to the sound discretion of the
court.15 4 Application to withdraw the appeal must be made, how-
ever, to the proper court having jurisdiction to dismiss. 15 In the
case of arbitration, it would appear that for the thirty day period
following the filing of the arbitration award, the court, as defined
152. Id. at R. 1(d) and R. 8(f).
153. In actions designated for arbitration, the parties are free to file motions
and the court is free to consider and decide such motions at any time; however,
the pendency of a motion "shall not be cause for delaying an arbitration hearing
unless the court so orders." N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(q).
154. State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, 111 S.E.2d 1 (1959); see also Bongardt v.
Frink, 265 N.C. 130, 136, 143 S.E.2d 286, 290 (1965), quoting McFetters v.
McFetters, 219 N.C. 731, 14 S.E.2d 833 (1941).
155. McFetters, 219 N.C. 731, 14 S.E.2d 833.
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by Arbitration Rule 8(f),156 would have jurisdiction to consider a
party's motion to withdraw its demand for a trial de novo. 157
This period is determinative because during this time the
arbitration award is a potential judgment of the court and not yet
a nullity. Even if one party has filed a timely demand for a trial
de novo, other parties may, within the thirty day period, move for
a rehearing pursuant-to Arbitration Rule 3(j),'5 8 file a stipulation
of dismissal pursuant to Arbitration Rule 6(a),159 or file their own
demand for trial de novo pursuant to Arbitration Rule 5(a).' 6 °
Thus the matter remains subject to the Arbitration Rules for the
entire thirty day period even after a party files written demand for
trial de novo. For this reason, it is reasonable to conclude that it
is the court, as defined by Arbitration Rule 8(f),161 that would have
jurisdiction to consider a party's motion to withdraw its demand
for a trial de novo. If the motion to withdraw the demand for a
trial de novo is allowed, then the clerk or court would enter judg-
ment on the arbitrator's award if otherwise proper.
The Arbitration Rules do not allow this result if the motion to
withdraw the demand for a trial de novo is not made until after
expiration of the thirty day period. With the expiration of the 30
day period the arbitration award must either be entered as a judg-
ment or it becomes a nullity and legally no longer exists for any
purpose. 62 The only authorization for the clerk or the court to
enter judgment on the arbitrator's award is Arbitration Rule
6(b). 163 If a party does file a demand for trial de novo within thirty
days after the award is filed, the arbitrator's award cannot be
entered as a judgment. This interpretation is consistent with sub-
sections (c), and (d) of Arbitration Rule 5, which state that the
trial de novo "shall be conducted as if there had been no arbitra-
156. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 8(f).
157. It is assumed that the party seeking to withdraw its demand for trial de
novo must give notice to the other parties and that those parties have the right to
be heard. Compare Rule i310 (Discontinuance), Rules of Civil Procedure for
Compulsory Arbitration, Pennsylvania: "No appeal may be discontinued except
by leave of court after notice to all parties or upon the filing of the written
consent of all parties."
158. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 3(j).
159. Id. at R. 6(a).
160. Id. at R. 5(a).
161. Id. at R. 8(f).
162. See discussion in Section II supra.
163. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 6(b).
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tion proceeding"164 and "[n]o evidence that there have been arbi-
tration proceedings or any fact concerning them may be admitted
in a trial .. .or any subsequent proceeding involving any of the
issues . . .or parties."' 65
This conclusion is also supported by the case of First Union
National Bank v. Richards, which began in small claims court
where the magistrate held that plaintiff had failed to "to prove
[its] case by the greater weight of the evidence" and "due to stat-
utes of limitations."166 Plaintiff gave notice of appeal for a trial de
novo and then filed a voluntary dismissal without prejudice pursu-
ant to Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 167 When plaintiff
refiled the lawsuit, defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds
that the magistrate's judgment was reinstated by plaintiffs volun-
tary dismissal of the original action. The trial judge agreed and
also concluded that the magistrate's judgment was res judicata
to the present action.'16  The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that once plaintiff gave notice of appeal for trial de novo,
"it was as if the case had been brought there originally"
and the magistrate's judgment was annulled and not there-
after available for any purpose. 169 Thus the dismissal of the
trial de novo did not constitute a dismissal of the appeal from
small claims court. There was no "appeal" to be dismissed 7 °
164. Id. at. R. 5(c).
165. Id. at R. 5(d).
166. 90 N.C. App. 650, 651, 369 S.E.2d 620, (1988).
167. N.C. Civ. Pro. R. 41.
168. 90 N.C. App. 650, 652, 369 S.E.2d 620, 621.
169. . "When an appeal as of right is taken to the Superior Court, in
contemplation of law it is as if the case had been brought there originally and
there had been no previous trial. The judgment appealed from is completely
annulled and is not thereafter available for any purpose." Id. at 653, 369 S.E.2d
at 622 (1988), quoting State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 507, 173 S.E.2d 897, 902
(1970)
170. This analysis is entirely different from that involved in determining
jurisdiction to consider motions to withdraw notice of appeal in regular appeals.
For instance in State v. Byrd, 4 N.C. App. 494, 167 S.E.2d 95 (1969), the trial
judge had no authority to allow defendant to withdraw his appeal once the
appeal had been docketed in the court of appeals. Once docketed only the court
of appeals had the authority to consider and grant defendant's motion to
withdraw the appeal. Compare, State v. Emanuel, 17 N.C. App. 164, 193 S.E.2d
120 (1972) (after docketing of appeal court of appeals considered and denied
defendant's motion to withdraw appeal). The distinction is that in regular
appeals the "appeal" is still pending throughout, while in matters subject to trial
de novo, once the demand for trial de novo is executed there is no "appeal" still
pending.
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and the magistrate's judgment was not available for "reinstate-
ment.'
7 1
Applying this analysis to court-ordered arbitration, it would
appear that once the thirty day period has expired and a party has
filed a written demand for trial de novo, the case is indistinguish-
able from cases pending in district or superior court that were not
eligible for court-ordered arbitration and there is no longer any
"appeal" to be withdrawn and no alternative judgment to be
reinstated.
If true that a party may be allowed to withdraw a filed
demand for trial de novo within the thirty days after the filing of
the arbitrator's award, then other parties can ensure the trial de
novo only by filing their own written demand. Must each party
filing a demand for trial de novo pay the seventy-five dollar filing
fee mandated by Arbitration Rule 5(b)? 172 Although the Rules
could be reasonably interpreted either way, the better interpreta-
tion, for largely practical reasons, is that the total filing fee paid to
secure a trial de novo should not exceed the compensation paid to
the arbitrator in the case. 173 Thus the first party to file a demand
for trial de novo should pay the filing fee. Other parties who subse-
quently file demands should not be charged a filing fee.'
74
171. In limited circumstances, i.e., when the appellant fails to appear at the
trial de novo, there is an express statutory basis in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-228(c)
for reinstating or "affirming" the magistrate's judgment. This exception is
discussed in subsection H. below. Although subsection (c) describes this action
as "dismiss[ing]" the "appeal" this seems inconsistent with First Union National
Bank. In any event, no such statutory exception exists for reinstating
arbitration awards if an appellant fails to appear at the trial de novo. It should
also be noted that the statutes provide one other situation where a demand for a
trial de novo can be withdrawn with the consequence that the lower court's
judgment is reinstated: N.C. GEN. STAT § 15A-1431(g) and (h), which concerns
the right of criminal defendants convicted in district court to "appeal" to superior
court for a trial de novo.
172. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 5(b).
173. This analysis is based largely on a memorandum from AOC Counsel
Thomas J. Andrews to Kathy Shuart. The memo notes that Arbitration Rule 5(a)
ties the amount of the filing fee to the arbitrator's compensation, that the
arbitrator's compensation in most cases is seventy-five dollars, and that
requiring a flat seventy-five dollar filing fee not only satisfies the apparent intent
of the Rules but also avoids significant bookkeeping and audit problems for the
clerks if the filing fee could vary from case to case. Memorandum from AOC
Counsel Thomas J. Andrews to Kathy Shuart (August 29, 1994) (on file with
Campbell Law Review).
174. In his memo, AOC Counsel Andrews states: "No demand should be
accepted for filing until a fee has been paid. Once that fee has been paid, no
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Upon completion of the trial de novo, Arbitration Rule 5(b)
provides that the party that paid the fee can seek a return of the
amount paid if, in the opinion of the trial judge, that party's "posi-
tion ... has been improved over the arbitrator's award." Even
when more than one defendant demanded trial de novo, the
defendant who paid the filing fee should generally be refunded the
fee if his position improved and denied the fee if his position did
not improve, without regard to the improvement of the position of
the other defendant. Even in cases where the defendant who paid
the filing fee improved his position while the defendant who also
demanded trial de novo but did not pay a filing fee did not, it
would be fair to return the fee to the first defendant. In such case
the trial judge could arguably order the second defendant to pay
the seventy-five dollar fee to the court.1 75
A final issue underlying the discussion in this section is
whether the demand for trial de novo by only one of multiple
defendants voids the arbitration award as to all parties and sets
the entire civil action, as originally filed, for trial de novo. The
discussion herein has been based on this assumption but there is
not universal agreement on this point. Nevertheless, the Arbitra-
tion Rules are properly interpreted to so provide.
Arbitration Rule 6(b) provides the only authority for the court
to adopt or enter the arbitration award as a judgment. This
authority can be exercised only if: (a) "the case is not terminated
by agreement of the parties," and (b) "no party files a demand for
trial de novo within thirty days after the award if filed."176 This
language is not ambiguous. If any party timely files a demand for
trial de novo the court is not allowed to enter judgment on the
award. There is no provision for a partial adoption or partial
entry of the arbitration award. If the award is not entered as a
judgment pursuant to the terms of Arbitration Rule 6(b), the
further fee should be accepted. A second or subsequent demand for trial de novo
should be filed without further payment of a filing fee. The clerk should not
prorate responsibility for the fee or refund any part of the fee paid at the first
filing." Id. at 2.
175. In his memo, AOC Counsel Andrews also states that in this situation the
court could decide not to refund the fee but instead to "order the non-prevailing
party to reimburse the prevailing party [who paid the fee]." Id. at 3. Similarly if
the party that paid the filing fee is subsequently allowed to withdraw his demand
for trial de novo while another demand for trial de novo has been filed by a party
who did not pay a filing fee, the judge should consider these same options. Id.
176. N.C. CT.-OnD. ARB. R. 6(b).
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award becomes a nullity and is no longer available for any
purpose.
17 7
This interpretation does not prevent a defendant who is satis-
fied with the arbitration award from using the award as the basis
for affirmatively settling the plaintiffs claim against him and hav-
ing the plaintiff dismiss him from the suit prior to the trial de
novo. All it prevents is the "de facto" settlement option that occurs
under the Rules when no party demands trial de novo and the
arbitration award is entered with "the same effect as a consent
judgment in the action,"' 78 i.e., as if the parties had expressly set-
tled the matter on the terms as set out in the award. Under the
Rules, this de facto settlement option is available only if all par-
ties acquiesce to the arbitration award in its entirety.
Other jurisdictions with court-ordered arbitration have simi-
lar approaches. Pennsylvania, the state that began court-ordered
arbitration, adopted Rule 1309, of the Rules Governing Compul-
sory Arbitration, in 1981. This rule provides that: "An appeal by
any party shall be deemed an appeal by all parties as to all issues
unless otherwise stipulated in writing by all parties."'79 This rule
was first proposed in 1975 by a Pennsylvania judge who sought to
end the complicated and "interminable" litigation that resulted
from a rule which provided that "[iln order to maintain an appeal-
ing party's right to jury trial on all issues involved in a case, his
appeal from arbitration may in certain cases carry with it other
parties to arbitration who have not technically filed appeals."'8 °
177. The arbitration award is not an adjudication suitable for adoption by the
court in the court's discretion. The arbitration award is generally not susceptible
of treatment as anything but a consent judgment because awards will usually
not contain any findings of fact or conclusions of law supporting the awards from
various defendants or on various claims. There is no basis for concluding that
Rule 54 of the N.. C. Rules of Civil Procedure somehow revives an arbitration
award and authorizes the court, at some later date, to enter a final judgment
based on a part of an arbitration award.
178. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 6(b).
179. Pa. R.C.P. No. 1309 (1998).
180. In a concurring opinion, in the case of Mitchell v. City of Pittsburgh,
Judge Price stated: "The case law concerning appeals nunc pro tunc from
compulsory arbitration is rapidly complicating this area of jurisprudence. Our
courts have stated: '(i)t is settled law that the mere appeal of one defendant in
compulsory arbitration is of no avail to another defendant, so that a judgment
entered after the lapse of appeal time will not be opened or stricken.' . . .
However, this general rule is weakened by exceptions developed on a case by case
basis. These exceptions have been less than clear, leading to uncertain results.
This method is not calculated to promote uniformity nor to insure equal and fair
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The Pennsylvania rules also provide that once filed no appeal for
trial de novo may be withdrawn "except by leave of court after
notice to all parties or upon the filing of the written consent of all
parties." 1
In Illinois, the arbitration rules provide that: "[iun the event
none of the parties files a notice of rejection of the award and
requests to proceed to trial within the time required herein, any
party thereafter may move the court to enter judgment on the
award.""8 2 Again it appears that the arbitration award may not
be entered as a judgment unless "none of the parties" seeks trial
de novo. This "all or nothing" interpretation is consistent with the
case of Kolar v. Arlington Toyota, Inc., discussed in Section III(E)
herein, which stated that the arbitration award must be accepted
or rejected in its entirety.
In California, Rule 1615(c) of the Judicial Arbitration Rules
for Civil Cases provides that: "The clerk shall enter the award as a
judgment... if no party has [timely] served and filed a request for
trial as provided in these rules."183 If any party does request a
trial, "[tihe case shall be restored to the civil active list" and shall
be tried "as though no arbitration proceedings had occurred."'8 4
Case law has confirmed this interpretation of the California rules.
In Muega v. Menochal,1s5 passengers injured in an automobile
accident had sued both the driver of the vehicle in which they rode
and the motorist who struck them from behind. After arbitration
the passengers requested a "limited" trial de novo, rejecting the
arbitration award as to the driver but accepting the award as to
the motorist who struck them from behind. The court held that
the passengers' request for a limited trial de novo operated to
"vacate the arbitration award in its entirety, putting the case at
large as though no arbitration proceedings had occurred."18 6 Fur-
treatment for all. I believe a far better approach would be to establish the rule
that an appeal by one party from compulsory arbitration acts as an appeal by all
parties on all issues." 335 A.2d 403, 404-405 (1975)
181. PA. R.C.P. No. 1310 (1998). There would be no need to notify all other
parties unless the entire matter was subject to trail de novo.
182. I.L.C.S. S.CT. R. 92(c) (1998).
183. CAL. RULES OF CT. R. 1615(c) (1997).
184. Id. at R. 1616(b), (c).
185. 57 Cal.Rptr. 697 (App. 1 Dist. 1996).
186. Id.; see also Trump v. Superior Court, 173 Cal.Rptr. 403 (App. 3 Dist.
1981) ("If plaintiffs claims against the various defendants were totally
unrelated, both legally and factually, a better argument could be made in favor of
a subsequent partial trial de novo. [But where] the claims emanate from a single
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thermore, in Rhode Island, Rule 5(c) of the Superior Court Rules
Governing Arbitration of Civil Actions, provides that in "consoli-
dated cases and in those involving multiple parties, cross-claims,
counterclaims and third-party claims, a rejection by any one party
will cause the entire civil action or actions to proceed to trial in the
normal course."
18 7
A party who has timely filed a written demand for trial de
novo will occasionally have second thoughts and will seek to with-
draw the "appeal" of the arbitrator's award and thereby reinstate
the arbitration award. The court has authority to allow a with-
drawal of a written demand for trial de novo in the thirty days
following the filing of the arbitration award and if the withdrawal
is allowed the arbitration award may be entered as a judgment
pursuant to Arbitration Rule 6(b).18 8 After the thirty days the
court has no authority to consider such a withdrawal request and
the arbitration award is also no longer available for entry as a
judgment. Thus any party who is dissatisfied with the arbitration
award and who wants to proceed with trial de novo should file its
own written demand for trial de novo and not rely on the fact that
another party had previously filed a demand for trial de novo.
integrated set of facts, and where resolution of a factual issue may affect several
theories of liability, the resulting award is more appropriately treated as
indivisible for purposes of subsequent trial.").
187. SUP. CT. ARB. R. 5 (1998). Compare Rule 6.3 of the Washington Court
Rules for Superior Court Mandatory Arbitration ("If within twenty days after the
award is filed no party has sought a trial de novo. . ., the prevailing party...
shall present to the court a judgment on the award of arbitration for entry as the
final judgment.") WASH SUPER. CT. MAR. 6.3 (1998). The U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of North Carolina also appears to have followed this rule.
Former Rule 610 of the Rules for Court-Annexed Arbitration provided that "any
party may file with the court a written demand for trial de novo" within thirty
days after the filing of the sealed arbitration award, and that "[ulpon such a
demand for a trial de novo, the action shall be placed upon the court's trial
calendar." Use of the term "action" clarifies that this rule referred to the entire
"civil action" that is subject to court-annexed arbitration under Rule 602 of the
Rules of the Middle District.
188. Even if a written demand for a trial de novo has been timely filed, the
"appeal" should also be dismissed if the party fails to "perfect the appeal" by
paying the seventy-five dollar filing fee at the time of filing or at least within the
thirty days allowed for filing the written demand. N.C. CT.-ORD. Ara. R. 5(b),
2(c), and 6(b). The better practice is for the clerk to refuse to file the written
demand for trial de novo if not accompanied with the filing fee.
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H. Dismissal for Failure to Appear at Trial De Novo
As discussed above, once the demand for trial de novo
becomes final, the status of the case is the same as if it had never
been through arbitration and the plaintiff has the right to take a
voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and the arbitration award is not thereby revived. Similar
question arise when one or both parties fail to appear at the trial
de novo. For instance, if the plaintiff had prevailed at arbitration
and the defendant timely sought trial de novo but failed to appear
at the trial de novo, the plaintiff might reasonably ask the judge
simply to adopt the arbitrator's award. Although it might seem
fair or good policy for the judge to adopt, affirm or reinstate the
arbitration award when the party who sought the trial de novo
fails to appear for the trial, the rules and applicable statutes do
not allow it. The Rules are clear that. no new judgment of the dis-
trict or superior court can be based on the arbitration proceeding
or the arbitrator's award.18 9 Once before the district court or supe-
rior court judge, the plaintiff may not rely on the arbitration pro-
ceeding in any way but is obliged to proceed de novo with
plaintiffs evidence.
If it is the plaintiff who sought the trial de novo but fails to
appear and prosecute, the judge may respond with appropriate
sanctions, for instance, dismissal under Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b) for failure to prosecute. 190 A judge has the power ex mero
motu to dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 41(b) for failure to prose-
cute,' 91 although the specific facts of each case should be consid-
ered before determining that dismissal of the matter is
appropriate. 192 Rule 41(b) expressly states that the dismissal can
be with or without prejudice. 193 Thus, in cases where both parties
fail to appear and where the plaintiff may be less blameworthy
than the defendant, the judge might choose, despite plaintiffs fail-
189. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 5(c) and (d), see also R. 6 (commentary).
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-41(b).
191. Perkins v. Perkins, 88 N.C. App. 568, 569-70, 364 S.E.2d 166, 167 (1988);
Blackwelder Furniture Co., v. Harris, 75 N.C. App. 625,627, 331 S.E.2d 274, 275
(1985); Hoglen v. James, 38 N.C. App. 728, 729, 248 S.E.2d 901, 902 (1984).
192. See Jones v. Stone, 52 N.C. App. 502, 505, 279 S.E.2d 13, 15, disc. rev.
denied, 304 N.C. 195 (1981); Green v. Eure, 18 N.C. App. 671, 672, 197 S.E.2d
599, 600 (1973) (dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper only when the
plaintiff manifests an intention to thwart the progress of the action to its
conclusion, or by some delaying tactic plaintiff fails to progress the action toward
its conclusion.)
193. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-41(b).
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ure to appear, to continue the case rather than dismiss it, or to
dismiss without prejudice rather than with.194 In any event, as
discussed above, a Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to prosecute is a
dismissal of the action itself and not a dismissal of the "appeal."
195
A Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice would be an adjudication on
the merits and a Rule 41(b) dismissal without prejudice would
allow plaintiff to refile, as would a Rule 41(a) voluntary dismis-
sal.196 However, in neither event would the arbitrator's award
resurface.
This analysis changes significantly if the civil action at issue
originated as a small claims action under section 7A-228 of the
North Carolina General Statutes.' 97 In perfected appeals from
small claims court, if the appellant fails to "appear and prosecute
his appeal" the presiding judge "may" dismiss the appeal and
affirm the judgment of the magistrate, pursuant to section 7A-
228(c). 9 8 The court's authority to dismiss an action for plaintiffs
failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b) is not identical with
the power expressly created by section 7A-228(c) to dismiss the
194. If it is the defendant who demands trail de novo but then fails to appear,
the defendant does successfully avoid the arbitration award and is not subject to
a dismissal for failure to prosecute. Yet there is a serious cost for such
defendant. It seems likely that the absent defendant would lose his seventy-five
dollar filing fee and possibly be subject to additional costs. See N.C. CT.-ORD.
APB. R. 7. Additionally, unless the parties have mutually agreed not to appear at
the scheduled trial, the absent defendant risks the likelihood that the plaintiff
will appear to prosecute the case and possibly receive a larger judgment against
the defendant which would seem more likely without defendant present to
balance the evidence presented to the judge or jury. If the parties had mutually
agreed not to appear, then the parties should have filed a stipulation with the
court, Arb. Rule 6(a), to aid the court in efficiently disposing of cases. N.C. CT.-
ORD. ARB. R. 6(a). Thus this approach does not appear to encourage a losing
party at arbitration to appeal for a trial de novo but then fail to appear at the
trial, and neither does it penalize the winning party at arbitration.
195. Compare First Union National Bank v. Richards, 90 N.C. App. 650, 653,
369 S.E.2d 620, 621 (1988) (After appeal from a magistrate's order in small
claims court, plaintiffs voluntary dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 41(a)
held not to function as an abandonment, withdrawal or dismissal of the appeal.).
196. N.C. GEN. STAT § 1A-41(a).
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-228 (1998).
198. A similar provision could have been included in the Arbitration Rules but
was not. Although it can be argued that the small claims appeal is analogous to
an appeal from arbitration, there are also significant differences (see discussion
of Arbitration Rules in Section 1 supra).
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appeal when the appellant fails to prosecute the appeal. 199 Rule
41(b) does not empower a judge to do anything with regard to a
defendant who has no counterclaim but simply fails to appear at
trial.
The question remains whether section 7A-228(c) would apply
to a party who, after participating in a small claims proceeding,
appealing the small claims award, participating in court-ordered
arbitration, and demanding a trial de novo, failed to appear at the
trial de novo. If section 7A-228(c) did apply, the effect would be
not to affirm the arbitrator's award but to affirm the magistrate's
award. As discussed above, the arbitration award, and indeed the
entire arbitration proceeding, is a nullity once a party has prop-
erly demanded a trial de novo pursuant to Arbitration Rule 5(a),
and no judicial official is authorized to enter judgment on the arbi-
tration award pursuant to Arbitration Rule 6(b). Thus the matter
must be "conducted as if there had been no arbitration proceed-
ing."20 0 Following these directives, the trial de novo is properly
viewed then as the actual "appeal" from small claims court as con-
templated and described in sections 7A-228, 7A-229 and 7A-
230.201 If this analysis is correct, then upon the defendant's failure
to appear at the trial de novo that resulted from defendant's
"appeal" of the arbitration award, section 7A-228(c) would apply to
allow the judge to dismiss defendant's appeal because of defend-
ant's failure "to appear and prosecute his appeal" and to affirm the
judgment of the magistrate.
The result would also be different if the judge dismissed the
lawsuit pursuant to Rule 41(b) because of plaintiffs failure to
appear or if the plaintiff took a voluntary dismissal pursuant to
Rule 41(a). In these cases, if the dismissal is without prejudice,
the slate is wiped clean and the plaintiff is free to refile the law-
suit and to proceed as if for the first time. The magistrate's judg-
ment and the arbitrator's award are nullities and of no effect.
This was the result in First Union National Bank202 in which the
defendants contended that the magistrate's judgment became a
final judgment when plaintiff took a voluntary dismissal of its first
199. See generally Fairchild Properties v. Hall, 122 N.C. App. 286, 289, 468
S.E.2d 605, 607 (1996), where the court held N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-228(c) applied
only when defendant-appellant failed to appear at a regularly set trial. See also
Windley v. Dockery, 95 N.C. App. 771, 383 S.E.2d 682 (1989).
200. N.C. CT.-ORD. ARB. R. 5(c).
201. N.C. GEN. STAT. § § 7A-228-230.
202. 90 N.C. App. 650, 653, 369 S.E.2d 620, 621 (1988).
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action. After the magistrate's judgment was entered, plaintiff
exercised its right to appeal for trial de novo in the district court
pursuant to section 7A-228(a).2 °3 If plaintiff had failed to appear
at that trial and prosecute its appeal or if plaintiff had withdrawn
or dismissed its appeal, the appeal would have been dismissed and
the magistrate's judgment affirmed. However, plaintiff did not
abandon, dismiss or withdraw its appeal but rather took a volun-
tary dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 41(a).2 °4 Defendants'
contended that the magistrate's judgment became a final judg-
ment when plaintiff took a voluntary dismissal of the first action,
that the magistrate's judgment was thus entitled to res judicata
effect barring the second action that plaintiff filed. 20 5 The Court of
Appeals rejected this argument.
CONCLUSION
Alternative dispute resolution is often praised because it
allows disputing parties to focus on equitable considerations,
maintaining relationships, and compromise rather than the less
accommodating or friendly enforcement of rights that is the focus
of traditional adjudication.20 6 The ADR approach is generally
accomplished by reducing the need for legal representation which
in turn is accomplished by streamlining the rules of civil proce-
dure that complicate and extend the time and effort required to
complete traditional litigation. Yet ADR is criticized for its avoid-
ance of the legal representation and civil procedures that have
developed to enhance the accuracy, fairness and predictability of
traditional adjudication.20 7
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. In an often quoted speech to the American Bar Association , Chief Justice
Warren Burger described the American legal system as "too costly, too painful,
too destructive, too inefficient for a truly civilized people." Chief Justice Warren
Burger, Speech to the American Bar Association (Feb. 12, 1984). In the Dispute
Resolution: A Task Force Report by the North Carolina Bar Foundation (June,
1985), the Task Force identified the benefits of ADR as including the following:
(1) it may provide an opportunity to deal with underlying issues in a dispute; (2)
it may build among disputants a sense of accepting and owning their own
eventual settlement; (3) it has a tendency to mitigate tensions and build
understanding and trust among disputants, thereby avoiding the bitterness
which may follow adjudication; and (4) it may provide a basis by which parties
negotiate their own dispute settlements in the future. Id., at page 11.
207. See discussion infra, n 23-29.
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As Carrington states:
Settlement is likely to occur when both disputing parties foresee a
particular, official disposition that is imminent. Settlement so
induced and thus reached 'in the shadow of the law' may be the
best possible method of resolving disputes; it is, or at least may be,
agreeably just, speedy, and cheap. It is not aptly described as
ADR, but is a direct consequence of formal adjudication. Still bet-
ter, enlightened procedure, when it works as intended, induces cit-
izens to avoid quarrels by performing their duties and observing
the rights of others in order to avoid the lash of the law. In this
way, effective, predictable adjudication hopes both to prevent dis-
putes and to limit abuses of power as well as to resolve disputes
that must inevitably occur. In this respect, the bickering of liti-
gants can serve the interests of others, including the public inter-
est, by preventing many other disputes from arising and by
conforming at least some individuals' conduct to the law. When
we think of the social cost of a particular lawsuit, we ought there-
fore think of it in relation to the bulk of other disputes that were
settled in the shadow of the one case that is fully contested, and in
relation to the still larger bulk of disputes that never arose
because conduct was shaped to avoid them and the consequences
of resolution according to law. When we speak of alternatives to
adjudication, we may speak of institutions or methods of resolving
disputes having less, or in some circumstances no, concern for the
law or its rights and duties. To the extent that ADR methods lack
concern for accurate application of law to fact, they resemble trial
by ordeal, or other ancient methods. There is nothing novel about
deciding disputes without regard for the legal entitlements of the
parties. Common sense and a millennia of experience with such
methods suggest that they tend to be less effective at inducing
parties to settle their differences in the shadow of the law, or to
conform their behavior to the law's commands. Thus, in general,
if we want citizens to perform their legal duties and settle their
disputes in accordance with one another's rights, well-conducted
rmal adjudication is the method of dispute resolution best suited
to that want.20 8
Of all the ADR options, 20 9 court-ordered arbitration may come
closest to addressing the concerns of both ADR proponents and
critics-but only if the arbitrator performs her proper function and
208. Paul D. Carrington, ADR and Future Adjudication: A Primer on Dispute
Resolution, 15 REV. LITIG. 485 (Summer 1996).
209. Tennessee Court Rule 31, lists the following ADR options: mediation,
judicial settlement conference, non-binding arbitration, neutral case evaluation,
mini-trial and summary jury trial. TN. Sup. CT. R. 31 (1997).
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if the arbitration award performs only its limited function. The
arbitrator must take seriously her job as adjudicator and resolve
the matter based upon the rights and liabilities of the parties.
The arbitrator must communicate the basis for her adjudication/
award to the parties so that the parties will feel that they have
had a day in court. The arbitration award must not be a compro-
mise or a proposed settlement. It should be perceived as a legiti-
mate forecast of the likely outcome of the matter if subjected to
formal adjudication. The challenge for the arbitrator is to achieve
at least the appearance of a formal adjudication in the context of a
sixty minute proceeding in which the arbitrator must ensure that
each party presents its relevant evidence without regard to techni-
cal or procedural flaws unless basic fairness requires exclusion.
The parties can still benefit from legal representation at the
arbitration hearing, so long as the attorney does not proceed as if
the arbitration hearing was a traditional trial, but the parties are
not seriously disadvantaged if they proceed pro se. Likewise the
Rules of Evidence and other procedural rules are relevant and can
help the arbitrator direct the proceeding, but the arbitrator can
dispense with the rules if the rules interfere with a full and fair
presentation of the evidence. Clearly much depends on the arbi-
trator's discretionary decisions during the arbitration, decisions
that can only be judged in the unique context of each arbitration.
Once she explains the decision to the parties and enters the
award, the arbitrator's job is finished. The parties have an adjudi-
cation based on an application of the law to the facts as found by
the arbitrator-albeit a less formal adjudication than a traditional
trial would produce. And the parties have a deadline "in the
shadow of the law," that will require some reflection on settlement
and some action if settlement is not desired. This is the modest
goal of court-ordered arbitration, i.e., that early in the progress of
a litigation the parties are given a day in court that produces a
resolution of the dispute that models the resolution that tradi-
tional litigation would produce, and the resolution will automati-
cally settle the case unless a dissatisfied party takes affirmative
action to continue the litigation. At least for relatively small civil
cases, this procedure seems to help settle cases.
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